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The senior minority representative of the House
Appropriations Committee* James V« Good of Iowa, proposed
an amendment to a deficiency appropriation bill on
February 28, 1919* The amendment was proposed and adopted
on the floor, in the Committee of the whole House i but it
was not signed into law by the President until July 11,
1919 • That amendment has become known as the "gag" law
and remains a section within the U.S. Code.
Hi U.S. Stat. 68 (1919)l IB U.S.C. 1913 (1970).
Scott « Cutllp and Allen H. Center, Effective Public
Halations 4th ed., (Snglewood Cliffs,""?. J.i Prentice-Hall,
1971), v* 5^6| James L. HcCaray, Government Publicity
(Chicago 1 University of Chicago Press, 1939)» P» 7. As
will be shown, the term "gag" is a popular reference to
the law, not used Incident to the passage of the amendment*
For ease of usage, quotation marks will not be used. The
statute follows
1
"Section 6—That hereafter no part of the money appro-
priated by this or any other Act shall, in the absence
of express authorization by Congress, be used directly
or indirectly to pay for any personal service, adver-
tisement, telegram, telephone, letter, printed or
written matter or other device intended or designed to
Influence in any manner a Member of Congress to favor
or oppose, by vote or otherwise, any legislation or
appropriation by Congress, whether before or after the
Introduction of any bill or resolution proposing such
legislation or appropriation! but this shall not pre-
vent officers and employees of the United States from
communicating to Members of Congress, through the
official channels, requests for legislation or appro-





The amendment received little public attention at
the tine. It has received little notice since and there
have been no convictions under the statute in any of its
original or revised forms. Nevertheless* the conditions
of the law f s passage and the principles Involved are
fundamental to the federal principle of separation of
powers.
When passed » the amendment made explicit a pro-
hibition of the use of legislatively appropriated funds by
federal officials in the promotion of programs pending
legislative or approprlatlve action. Hie law provided
punishment to the degree of removal of the offending offi-
cial, one year imprisonment* and a fine of 1500—
a
misdemeanor.
The principle involved was one upon which there
can be little argument. The people # s money will not be
used to propagandize the people or their representatives
for the purposes of the executive. However, once past
the tacit unanimity upon the point of principle, the
conduct of the public business.
Any officer or employee of the United states who,
after notice and hearing by the superior officer
vested with the power of removing him is found to have
violated or attempted to violate this section shall be
removed by such superior officer from office or employ-
ment. Any officer or employee of the United States who
violates or attempts to violate this section shall also
be guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $^QQ or by
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both."
—41 U.S. Stat. 68 (1919)
i«
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parameters of right conduct are not clear. No one has
defined the line where meets the government's obligation
to Inform Its citizens and the politician's temptation to
proselyte them.
In late February 1919t conditions were such that
the Congress found It necessary to attempt such a defini-
tion. The experience of the Immediately preceding years
constituted such a threat to the legislative branch that
It was necessary to make the proscription explicit and
provide the threat of punishment. The Congress has seen
fit to periodically revise and renew the law, even though
rigorous enforcement Is impracticable.
There Is general agreement that the year 1919
marks the beginning of a long period of reaction to war-
time expedience and morality. The men who were foremost
In the passage of the gag law were also foremost among the
reactionaries. They delighted In the latter categorization.
But the point remains that if such men were in the vanguard
of the reactionary movement, they also likely reflected
the sentiments of the electoral majority. The congressional
elections of 1918 returned the republican Party to the
majority column and the presidential election of 1920
resulted in a Republican landslide. The 1920 candidate and
platform were as much the handiwork of the reactionaries
as was the gag law. what, then, were the old, much-abused
) *i
kstandpatters2 reacting against?
ihe War Administration of Voodrow Wilson had im-
posed severe strains upon traditional concepts of federal
structure. These strains showed in the state-federal
relation, the individual's constitutional guarantees,
and especially the legislative-executive relation. From
the perspective of the Congress, the reaction was directed
at the executive's abrogation of unprecedented powers of
administration, appropriation, and information, gained
and maintained under pressures of wartime crisis.
what was increasingly apparent to the Congress was
that the administration intended to retain and use war
emergency methods for domestic, post-war programs. This
was not an unreasonable objective in early 1919 since
there was no formal peace in Europe and domestic conditions
closely resembled those of the recent war. ihere could be
little disagreement between the Wilson Administration and
Congress as to the existing chaos at home and abroad.
*The term standpatter is Inseparable from the
person of John Joseph Gurley Cannon. In 1902, rounding
up votes for his accession to Speaker of the House, he
let It be known that his politics were "stand by the
status" (Mowry, The Era of Theodore fioogevelt . p. 118).
Cannon's biographer, flair rolles, associated the word with
the Speaker's poker playing propensities, whatever the
origin, the word came to mean the conservative wing of the
Hepubllcan Party. e standpatters generally resisted any
legislation which threatened the status quo maintaining at
the end of the nineteenth century. Toward the end of the








5There was considerable disagreement as to the solution and
the aeans used, to achieve it*
Conservative Republicans perceived the political
and economic situation as an attempt by the administration
to continue the highly effective methods of the war at
home. his program was manifested by a continued pro*
liferatlon of specialised executive agencies and federal
officials. With continued high levels of appropriated
support and continued Information programs, the support of
a political majority could be fashioned. Besides the
existing Democratic Farty, it could be assumed that a
substantial number of homeless Progressives and Socialists
would form the majority*
The mortal flaw, as it was well realized by the
standpatters, was the requirement for the appropriations.
They interpreted the November 1918 election message as
economy in government. Accordingly, their main theme was
the linkage of placeholders to the wastage of public funds.
The most wasteful of all, they alleged, were the
propagand 1 sts
•
The standpatters* attack was comprehensive. Ine
Mar Department and the General Staff were typed as Prussian
autocrats, completely insensitive to the constitutional
rights of Americans as individuals. The Department of
Labor and the United States i^mployment Service were por-






process In favor of a special class. Implicit in every
indictment were strong feel Inge against George creel and
the Committee on Public Information (CPI). The CPI was
used ae a symbol of the hypocrisy in the whole process.
What was "feedback" to Creel was promotion to his enemies.
The point of attack was the federal bureaucrat* not the
social units with which he was associated. Only the
mavericks attacked organized labor , or the industrialists,
or even the professors. The consummate politician did not
make the propaganda target explicit—he made the propa-
gandleer himself explicit.
The standpatters used the forum and the vehicle
of the Congress. narnf knew the rules of the legislative
assembly and they used them to outmaneuver the Progressives
as well as the Democrats, who were generally less inclined
to find fault with the Wilson apparatus. In masterful
fashion, the Republicans forced Wilson to call a special
session seven months early, giving them a forum. They
attached their riders to appropriation bills badly needed
by the executive. They used the rules of the House to
control which issues would be raised and to what degree
of specificity. they found the one issue upon which the
Congress and the electorate could agree. That issue was the
restoration of legislative supreaaoy over the executive.










7One source of the reaction was certainly partisan
politics. More than that, however, the reaction depended
upon fundamentally differing perceptions of the constitu-
tionally derived Institutions of the legislative and the
executive branches. At the highest level of the presidency
and the cabinet, the executive was perceived as responsible
for an attempt to alter the relation between the Individual
citizen and the federal government.
The War Department—through the use of the univer-
sal selective service, a large federal standing army, the
rigorous Articles of War, and Involvement In Investigations
of domestic subversion—had come Into the direct exercise
of unprecedented powers. he United States Employment
Service and the Department of Labor were viewed as pursuing
policies which ultimately would change traditional economic
and political relationships within the nation. The Insti-
tutionalization of new programs and bureaucracies threatened
the representative-constituent relation. Mddle echelon
bureaucrats would control the channels of communications
and appropriations to new political groupings*
The implications of poet-war administration
policies were perceived as a threat to the traditional
representative process. The wartlae expediencies, although
a spectacular adventure in centralized administration, were
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CHAPTEn I
THE OBJECTIVES OP THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE FOB
LABOR AKD DEMOCRACY
The Committee on Public Information (CPI) was often
accused of partisan political activity* The charges were
Invariably denied. Certainly the potential for partisan
activity was present In the far flung organization and
broad assessment of mission* he congressional reaction
against the committee Is a measure of one branch of govern-
ment's evaluation* In one pa tlcular aspect the various
Individuals Involved were able to use the circumstances of
the times to develop Implicit political objectives* It was
these broad domestic political activities which Congress
reacted against In the passage of the gag law*
The Great War
The "Great War" or "World War" was a break from the
traditional wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
In one particular aspect* It was the first major
post-Industrial conflict. This claim Is often made for the
Civil War and also for the Franco-Prussian War of 1970.
The difference Is that after 191^t the implications of mod-
ern war as concerns the total mobilization of the society
were clear to a substantial segment of the population.
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The Prussian victory of 1870 was a quick, decisive act
which proved their staff, railroad system, and mobiliza-
tion superior. The Civil War was totali but nineteenth
century romanticism affected the society's retrospective
view.
After the 191^ Koltke-3chlieffen offensive stalled
at the Marne, the trench rece to the channel began. Once
the trenches were set, the war became a contest of indus-
trial and agricultural capacity. The battle was no longer
one of army against army, or mobilization plan against con-
scription policy. The violence was universalized to include
belligerent culture, history, and even philosophy. That is
to say, the surviving expressions of official policy and
influential analysis reflect this total war attitude.
These attitudes were not necessarily shared by even a ma-
Jority of the population of the United States.
Nevertheless, these attitudes and assumptions
formed the major operative policies of the national admin-
istration* Initial estimates of men, cannon, shells,
ships, and bayonets were irrelevant to what was eventually
produced. The army was alledged to be unable even to make
estimates. This was considered to be 3 confession of
ineptitude.-'
Another analysis assumes that the existing mili-
tary services could not possibly anticipate the degree of
participation in the "great war" because they had been




campaign, the reluctance of the administration to Initiate
preparedness measures, and the traditionally contradictory
flow of public opinion In the democratic United States
served to confuse rather than guide the war-making depart-
ments of the administration*
The Immediate result was a policy vacuum. War, of
one kind or another, to Include merely arming merchant
ships or marching on Berlin i had been on the horizon for
some time* Ideas and programs to satisfy either end of
the contingency continuum were abroad In the societies of
preparedness, business, schools, professionals, etc. The
policy of the Wilson Administration was to leave them in
the civil society. As war approached, a curious division
of tasks developed. War or emergency-related Issues were
dealt with by expanding the federal government and creating
new agencies for the new issues* Unlike old wars, when
volunteers flowed into the army as militia or state con-
trolled national guardsmen, in 1917 volunteering was
suspended in favor of a national draft. Great numbers of
private persons converged on Washington to direct the war.^
Ihe question facing the Wilson Administration in
the early months of 1917 was largely a pragmatic one. The
presidential campaign of 1916 had affirmed the personal
committment of the President not to enter the war. Unfor-
tunately, the International situation had worsened to the
point that there was a real possibility of the Allies
losing it. Such a loss, combined with the assumption of
mMt&mMMmm. attt at burr ttm till M
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power by the Bolsheviks, could not fall to have political*
economic, and social consequences for the United States.
The preparedness campaign had continued to rain
strength through the presidential election. Numerous
Influential voices supported the entry of the United States
into the war. This was especially painful for the adminis-
tration because, to a large degree, the preparedness advo-
cates were, in many cases, the same old Progressives who
supported Wilson's domestic program. Should the Allies
suddenly collapse in the face of the renewed unrestricted
submarine warfare, the Allies might not be able to repay
their loans, and the unfolding revolution might well sweep
Western Europe in the chaos of military defeat.
?
Accordingly, although the entire administration
strove mightily to remain pacific in thought as well as
deed, organizational entitles for the prosecution of war
were forming. The first of these was the Council of
National Defense (CMC). 8
The Military Appropriations Act was Introduced in
the spring of 1916. The second section of that act
empowered the proposed council, composed of the secretar-
ies of *ar. Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and
Labor, to ensure coordination of industries and resources
for the national security and welfare.
.More importantly, the act directed that the council
nominate and the President appoint an Advisory Commission
of seven private individuals with expertise in areas of
1 •©*
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labor, industry* public utilities, and natural resources.
Congress did not enact the act until June 3» 1916.
There is little doubt thattCongress intended the
Advisory Commission as a research and consultative body.
Only $200,000 was appropriated for traveling expenses,
clerical assistance, and supplies. And yet, by JuneJ30,
1917» thirty-five committees and subcommittees with duties
ranging from alaohol and aluminum to wool and zinc had been
formed. The members of the committee were a lexicon of
industrial magnates, including H. F. Sinclair and £• L.
Doheny, committee on oilt James A. Farrell, President,
United states Steel Co.* Thomas F. Hanville and J. D. Ryan,
President of Anaconda Copper Co. The first director of the
council was Walter S. Gifford» formerly chief statistician
of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. *
The organization reached full growth March 4, 1918
when the President created the *ar Industries Board (WIB)
out of the Advisory Commission and appointed Bernard Baruch
12
as its first chairman. The history of the WIB is an epic
in Itself and the subject of much controversy. The attitudes
toward organization which the WIB reflected and which were
adopted in the early stages of the war are germane.
The Advisory Commission to the Council of National
Defense was the model upon which all subsequent executive
agencies built. It was the first, most comprehensive in
representation, and the only organization authorized by
legislation. ^
*If fjff I
* ifiwM^Mtt ic?i." -war








Early in the frame, the Congress realized what was
happening. The action organizations were beyond congress-
lonal controls. Conversely, the legislatively legitimate
agencies represented by Cabinet officers continued to per*
form generally the same functions they had In peacetime.
Under the very real Justification of modern, world-wide
war, many private citizens carried out many public func-
tions under the most general executive authorization,
tot having appeared before Congress for legislative auth-
orization, the "dollar-a-year" men first appeared for
accounting when they sought appropriations to continue
operations already started.
Faced with an executive fait accompli and a very
real war emergency, Congress provided the appropriations,
/
/
though in lesser amounts than those requested. The execu-
tive agencies themselves continued their operations aa
necessary In pursuit of the efficient prosecution of the
war. Congressmen such as Joseph G. Cannon
( epublican-Illlnois) retained a certain cynicism as to
the real political and economic motives of the special
boards and commissions. The members of the extraordinary
groups railed at the inefficiency and parsimony of Congress. 15
The sole representative of labor at the heady level of the
federal government's Cabinet officers and industry's titans
on the Advisory Commission was 3amuel Gompers. He was an
original member of the commission and participated in its
first meeting December 6, 1917 • In fact, he dictated the
•
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minutes of that meeting. After the declaration of war,
Gompers called tog-ether 175 representatives of the execu-
tive council of the AFL on March 12, 191?» A declaration
entitled "American Labor's Position in Peace or in War"
was Issued the ease date. That declaration remained the
"charter" for the organized labor position throughout the
war, and Gomper's participation in governmental decisions
at the highest operationsl levels lent force to the AFL's
position*
"
When the WIB was established as a separate entity,
there was a veteran AFL official as a member* Grosvenor
Clarkson, the official historian of the CND and WIB,
described his duties. "Strictly speaking, Prayre was not
on the Board to represent labor, but to manage lt."xo '
Besides the powerful relations of the AFL and its saber-
dinate organisations, Goapars could use the "... p-reet
field forces of the Council of National Defense under which
operated the 184,000 units of the state, county, community
and municipal councils of defense throughout America, a
machinery which transmitted to the people of the country
the war measures and needs of the National Administration. . . "^
The rapid succession of executive agencies broadly covered
all aspects of American life* Clarkson, speaking of the
WIB, summed upt
Thus the War Industries Board, already supreme in
materials, facilities, finance, and transportation,
wheresoever Involved in the Industrial prosecution of
the war, now became the allocator of men, not only
between industries, but between civil and military life.
i ? i J : . -* J j
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It wa» an Industrial dictatorship without parallel—
a
dictatorship by force of necessity and common consent
which step by step at last encompassed the Katlon and
united it into a coordinated and mobile whole, support-
ing the army and the navy with all the incomparable
strength of the greatest industrial potentiality in
the world. 20
The CPI and Labor
One of the most controversial organizations of the
many which grew out of the CKD was the Committee on Public
Information. The committee, headed by "George Creel,
Chairman," was created by executive order one week after
the declaration of war. 21 The original impetus was for a
censorship operation. his was rapidly transmuted into a
propaganda operation, both foreign and domestic. As the
one central point for the origination of government messages.
It was embroiled in controversy from the day of its birth.
he committee was divided into two main sections,
Foreign and Domestic. Between the two sections there were
more than twenty specialized divisions. ^ Of these, only
two could be identified as having duties involving capital
and labor. They were the Labor Publications Division and
the Industrial Belatlons Division. The latter only existed
under CFI direction in February and Karch 1918« when it was
transferred Intact with its director, Hoger i« Babson, to
the Department of Labor. ^
By September 1917 • the need for direct access to
American labor was apparent to George Creel and Samuel
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Terms of Peace had been formed in New York In that month,
hie organization was closely allied to the American
Socialist movement that had declared its opposition to the
war. The council derived largely from a 191^ organization
called the Emergency Peace Federation. Some of its more
prominent members were Gorman Thomas, Scott Nearing, and
Norris Hillquit. The organizational shift was a conscious
attempt to bring the peace movement more in line with the
social objectives of the Socialist worker's movements. By
191?t the principal tactic for stopping the war was one of
work stoppages and strikes. Paralyzing the belligerent's
industrial capacity would force the fighting to a halt.
*
To counter this incursion into the working class,
the CPI's Labor Publications Division merged with the AFL's
American Alliance for Labor and Democracy (AALD). In fact,
whatever CPI personnel who were working in the Hew York-based
Labor Publications Division (LPD) were simply transferred on
paper to the distribution section. From September 1917
until late 1913, the same names appear on the letterheads
of the supposedly separate LPD and AALD.
The head of the LPD/AALD was Robert Kaisel, a former
•ber of the AFL's Labor Publicity Organization, and the
chief publicist was Chester M. Wright. 27 The CPI paid the
salaries, office rent, and certain expenses. These extra
expenses were to be a source of conaern and worry to George
Creel.




In a constant frenzy concerning the effects of the Russian
Revolution on their own domestic parties of the left.
Samuel Gompers established his anti-left-Socialist position
by refusing to attend a leftist-dominated labor conference
in London. In a spirit of internationalism, the British
Labour Party then sent a delegation to tour the United
States during late 1917* rhe AALD assigned two union mem-
bers to accompany the British and their on-the-road expenses
became a heated aatter between Creel and Kalsel.
Creel began the relation under the impression that
he was aerely paying the salaries and rent for the union
men. In September » he demanded the collection of all the
outstanding vouchers of the AALD* * This was clearly im-
possible, since the delegation with the British was still
on the road, addressing cheering crowds.™ Creel neverthe-
less ordered his business manager, "From now on, nothing is
to be paid from this office except salaries and rent."
Other expenses were to be paid by Philip Leslie stokes,
AFL treasurer.-*
;he argument as to who was to pay the mxp^nses of
the escort continued into March while new Issues arose as
well. The definition of expenses broadened considerably.
"Office" expenses due in March had risen to -;1,500. Maisel
wrote Clayton D« Lee, CPI business manager and retired
business executive who had assumed financial accounting
duties from the White Kouse disbursing clerk in October
32




with an advance check, such as was previously done by you.
so that bills such as these will not be paid by government
check." 53
On the same date* March 15, Creel was writing to
Carl Byoir at his tfew York address, the Hotel vmnderbilti
March 15 t 1918
Mr. Carl Byoir,
Hotel vanderbllt, *
New York City, N. Y.
My Dear Carl,
1 find that Lee has gone to New York, and the
enclosed setter calls for instant attention. I feel
rather bitterly about this billi but there seems to
be nothing to do but pay it. I want the check, how-
ever, to come through the American Alliance for Labor
and Democracy. Beach Lee at his home, have Maisel
send the check, and tell Lee to make arrangements to





The reason for the urgency is clear, creel had
decided, to go before the Appropriations Committee for
fiscal 1919 funds. The testimony would be on the record
and it would be unwise to have loose vouchers or obliga-
tions lying about to cause embarrassment. 35
Both Malsel and Creel clearly were aware of a source
of funds to be used by the AALD and controlled by Creel.
That these were not *overnraent funds, like those used to
pay salaries and rent, is also clear.
A letter dated December 3t 1917 from Cyrus
McCmrmick, President of the International Harvester Company,
.-- M
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Chicago* provides a clue to the source of the funds.
3 December, 191?.
Cyrus Mm McCormick
608 'outh Michigan Avenue
Chicago
fcy dear Mr. Craali
The i etter of introduction that I referred to in
speaking with you the last time I was in Washington,
was your letter of 31 October, introducing *r* Prank
Wolfe, of the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy*
Xr* Wolfe, wants to secure On* hundred thousand dollars,
and my Judgment is that if this is a matter In which
you are deeply intersted. One thousand dollars should
be sufficient from me as a contribution to that fund*
Kow referring to the other matter of hirty
thousand dollars, which you asked me to secure for
you,* how does that matter rank in importance, in your
mind, with this proposal from nr* Wolfe? I assume that
neither of these projects has anything to do with the
other* will you be good enough to tell me if I am
correct! that the amount of hirty thousand dollars is
the total sum which you hope to secure, and how soon
you wish to have It, and how far you are willing that
I should go in asking others to participate In the
subscription? I had the thought of mentioning this
Thirty thousand dollar matter to Rr« anderlip, and
Kr* Slsson, of the Guaranty Trust Company of §
York* I think he would be willing to help on this.
whenever you have time to answer me on these sub*

















Mr. Cyrus E. HcCormick
606 South Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois.
Mjr dear ftr. it Cornicki
Ihe Wolfe setter, relating to the American Alliance
for Labor and Teaocracy, is very close to us, and any
thing that you can possibly do frill be of tremendous
assistance* -his is our most important body, and I
am eager to have It stand on Its own feet. If you and
your friends in Chicago can help Wolfe, you will not
only please me, but others who are above me.
With regard to the other matter of thirty thousand
dollars, that was a personal thing that has to do with
the maintenance of a corps of highly trained writers
here in Washington for special assignment work. If
you and a small number of friends could raise this
amount, with you to act as trustee in its disburse-
ment, it would be of tremendous help to me and tb the




Cyrus WeCormlck had been an early political sup-
porter of woodrow Wilson and it is certainly possible that
he and Creel were cooperating in enterprises of this sort. 3**
It Is nevertheless unusual to suggest that wealthy Indus-
trail lsts had established a fund under the control of a
government official in order to advance the propagandizing
of labor.
Ihe AALD had begun field operations by fcarch 191B.
The Chlcago-Hilwaukee area was a prime target due to the
large Ceraan population, the past success of the Socialist
Party, and the agricultural/industrial Importance of the







volunteer preparedness organisations and defense councils
which had sprung up seemingly overnight.
There is considerable correspondence to the CFI
under the letterhead of the Wisconsin Loyalty Legion
,
Milwaukee* One member of their General Council was
w infield E. Gaylord, who was also a second vice president
of the AALD at ^2,080 a year in June 1918.
^
9 The legion f s
•Director of the Bureau of Literature" was Algie X. Simon,
a former editor of the Milwaukee Leader , and author. Slaon
informed the CPI of the demise of a Chicago-based Socialist
newspaper, the Appeal to Reason .
tfr. Gaylord* s duties were not limited to pamphlet
distribution. In early March, Carl Byolr relayed five
requests to Creel in memorandum form. Creel refused to
authorize "a series of meetings on the East Side (' .Y.),*
estimated cost 3500 .QOi $150.00 a week for support of offi-
ces in New York, Boston, and Chicago! and a request to send
an organizer through tfew York and Connecticut, ("reel
approved 11,000 in accrued bills for the central office
and a Kalsel request "to send Gaylord at $40.00 a week and
expenses through the middle west." ihe chairman added in
his own handwriting, "Gaylord—Chicago and Wisconsin before
election ^Creel^s emphasis/-" Gaylord reported a large
demonstration in April and was promoted to second vice
a?
president in June.
a kind of literature being distributed is typified






Economy, John E. Commons, of the University of Wisconsin.
The first, published about February 191P-t was titled, "why
Worklngaen Support the rfar."*3 A few quotes from the eight-
page booklet will show why It could not appear under
government authorships
• • American labor will come out of this war with
the universal eight-hour day and with as much power to
fix its own wages by Its own representatives as
employers have* (p. 3)
Capitalists are being controlled . • • by leaders whoa
the worklngoen themselves put on various war boards,
<P. 3)
All through these Industries President Wilson is
enforcing, as fast as the boards can get to it, the
eight-hour day, as well as time and one-half pay for
overtime work. (p. k)
All labor in this country is benefiting because
organised labor is actually "on the inside in running
the Government. " (p. 4)
Wage earners democracy is coming • • • (p. 5)
An example of legislative action taken at the state level
was the "Wisconsin Emergency Labor employment Act" in late
1917* Professor Commons drafted the act In cooperation
with the AALD. The act provided for the use of the
University of Wisconsin Extension agents In the Coordina-
tion of labor resources. * nils attempt to duplicate the
Department of Agriculture* s successful procedure Is a con-
stant throughout all governmental approaches to the labor
problem throughout the war. Jhe organizational assumptions
were to build upon the successful experience of the
Department of Agriculture. e consensus adhering to the







would be the departure point for establishment of govern-
ment employment offices. As Professor Commons wrote In
another AALD pamphlet* "Who Is Faying for This War?"t
Our Government Is building up a great system of employ-
ment offices which Germany and England had before the
war started* This will do away with an Immense amount
of lost time by workmen In hunting Jobs. (p. 8) 1*
The CPI and the Appropriations Committee
George Creel made rather a point of his facing his
congressional critics In Saftayat Large and flow We
Advertised America , other evidence suggests he was less
than enthusiastic about the prospect. He appeared In
mid-June 1918, well-prepared* and armed with a considerable
amount of material to Justify appropriated support* There
was n*v%T a second appearance, as Congress refused to con-
tinue support In 1919* The MB was the reluctant liquida-
ting agency and their report touched off the controversy
which resulted in a 1920 Senate Investigation. ?
The redoubtable chairman appeared before the
Congress as much in response to their criticism as otherwise.
Congressman Glllett of Massachusetts, soon to become the
Speaker of the House in Kay 1919* and one prime mover behind
the law prohibiting the hiring of publicity experts.^
mounted one attack on the constitutionality of the CPI in
December 1917* These attacks continued before the
Appropriations Committee* There were nine attacks in larch,
eighteen in April, thirteen in ray (decision made to appear
end of May), six In June and cnly three in July. One might
r" *
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say the CPI was rhetorically dragged before Congress. T
The sympathetic overview of Hock and Larson
remains the best general reference on the Committee's
organization. $" They identified twenty-one domestic divi-
sions and four foreign divisions (they did not specify
those divisions dealing with specific foreign countries).
George Creel testified on fifteen domestic divi-
sions* the organization of which does not conform to any
other report. he only division with a remote similarity
to the AALD/LPD is an " Industrial Division." he only
testimony mentioning the "Division of Labor Publications*
Emigrant Bldg., New York • . . $1,600." appears in a list
of rental estimates for seventeen CPI offices. he AALD
appears only twice* under testimony for the non-existent 1
Industrial Division's advisory commission where it is
allotted one member of six—the others being representa-
tives of the AFL, Department of labor* the CPI* the
war-making departments, and the manufacture**.^ Ihe
lengthy list of publications distributed includes 825*000
pamphlets for the AALD. The Commons pamphlets* "who is
Paying for This war" and "why aorklngmen • upport the War,"
are listed as "recent issues the distribution of which has
Just begun."* Both pamphlets carry the imprint of the
AALD, not the CPI.
There Is little doubt the CPI men were not entirely
candid* However, only in the report of personnel end sala-












testimony did not explicitly claim hie lists of employees
eo be comprehensive of ell activities* and public question*
ing did not force him to be entirely explicit on all
matters. As rpeel testified, the Labor Publications
Divlelon was listed as a subordinate part of the $ew York
Division of Distribution office under Henry Atwater. The
personnel listing of that division lists Kr. imon of
Milwaukee at $12 a year. It does not list Gaylord, alsel,
or Wright, and yet they were on the payroll for the not
inconsequential sums of $2,080, J2,600, and $2,600, respec-
tively." Ae a division of the CF1, the Labor Publications
Division was included under the New York distribution office*
which Justified salaries and office rental. The substan-
tive function of a domestic propaganda activity operating
among employers and employees was accounted for in very
general terms in testimony concerning the Industrial
Division." This exchange degenerated into a rather con-
fusing debate over functional definitions and will be
covered In Chapter II.
The CPI received an appropriation of 11,250,000
vice the *2, 098, 000 requested.* Congress did not address
the issue of the AALC/LFL, either choosing to Ignore it or
simply ignorant of the scope of the operation among labor.
Ihe work of the AALT continued. A convention was
held in St. Paul, Kinresota In June and Carl i yolr and
Henry Atwater allegedly wrote the resolutions to be presen-






ceased after the congressional hearings. This Is doubtful,
becuase the officers continued to make very specific reports
of activities and attendant costs. Chester *rlght com-
plained (July 3l# 1918) that the new sailing regulations
meant an increased cost of 3*H>0 annually to the AALD. Creel
directed him to use Atwater*s government trmnk at the CFI
Hew York office. 58
Maisel wrote a glowing letter to Byoir and Creel
shortly after Labor Day. He reported that there were
Alliance sponsored celebrations in 600 American cities.
Alliance speakers delivered 122 Labor lay addresses—at a
cost of £796. 55» ^ith traveling expenses added, the cost
to the CPl would be 11,096.95* The AAU) address in San
Antonio was delivered by f« A. ruraert In oan Francisco,
W» B. Rubin addressed the Labor Council and the Building
Trades Council, "... A feature of the procession was a
float designed as a replica of the steamer invincible at
a cost of sll,000# The float was presented to the Iron
Trades Council by J. J. lynan, vice President and General
Manager of the Bethlehem Jteel Corporation. "59
The money being spent was not inconsiderable, when
Samuel Gompers returned from the Inter-Allied Labor
Conference (November 9# 1918), the AALD sponsored a great
reception in Chicago. Samuel Insull, Chairman of the
Illinois Council of ?atlonal Defense, was a co-host and the
guest list Included twelve governors. Malsel began prepar-










"please advance 1500* 00. It is estimated the event will
eost i3»ooo-e4 # ooo.- 60
The final report Is Interesting because it returns
the issue to the C\'D f the parent of all the special boards
and agencies. Trnro Kataglrl has described this confusing
procedure froie the end of 1916 to Senator Smoot's Joint
6l
Committee on Printing Report of April 1920. The last
session of the 65th Congress had mandated the end of the
CPI by June 30 on Karch 1, 1919* Creel himself resigned
effective Kerch 15 • -He CKD report was not finally complete
until June 9t 1920.
62 he CND had accepted the task,
reluctantly, in September 1919* ^ *hat is of primary inter*
est here is the fact that the final report of the CKD stated
that no records of three divisions could be located
1
F/ctorial Publicity, Industrial delations* and Labor
Publicity. 64
George Creel *s popularized final report. How We
Advertised Acerlea . Rakes no mention of Hither the LPD or
the AALD except in the appendix, where the titles and num-
bers of the AALD pamphlets are listed. He did make a state-
ment to the CMD liquidating officer, E. X. Ellsworth, that
•
. . • the files and records of the Labor Publications
Division were incorporated with the files and records of
the Division of Civic, and Educational Cooperation** (Professor
Guy §« ?ord # s historians). ^ Unfortunately, the business
records, vouchers, receipts, etc. have been progressively






Professor Ford's records still comprise some thirty-odd
drawers , none of which beer directly on the LPD/A1LD.
Conversely, the latter files are contained In a single
drawer*
transition to Domestic Problems
Once the decision for war had been made, an organi-
sational Imperative was created which drew together the
Democratic Party, organized labor, the federal bureaucracy,
and the old Progressives of 1912. The fantastic success of
this coalition In fueling the war machine created attitudes
which were not restricted to the war emergency. If such a
combination could bring such domestic benefits, why not
project It past the war?
he CPI, by making unlversallst assumptions con-
cerning the role of the Onited states in the Great War,
was drawn into domestic propaganda activities far outside
existing laws and constitutional procedure. These activi-
ties led to Jurisdictional disputes within the executive
branch as well as conflict with the Congress.
The centralization of authority represented by
the early activities of the CJC provided an organizational
model which was imitated by other wartime agencies such as
the CPI. Though this situation was perhaps necessary to
the prosecution of the war in the early months, the unchecked
power created opportunities for the abuse of executive
prerogatives.
Believing themselves effective toward the end of the
H
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successful prosecution of the war, the officers of the
CPI progressively adopted questionable means of operation.
The Congress appropriated $1,250,000 to the committee In
1918* and that Is precisely the final amount Creel reported
for salaries. That such a balance should result seems
rather more than coincidental. Creel and Byoir were very
evasive before the Appropriations ommitteei but then It Is
doubtful the representatives desired them to be too explicit.
The disappearance of key records Is most often attributed to
Inefficiency. In combination, however, it can be safely
assumed that Congress suspected the worst of George Creel
and the CPI.
George Creel's committee nevmr had a real chance
of perpetuating Itself past the 1913 Armistice. However,
some of the functions, sections, and divisions entertained
such hopes. One of these was oger *. Babson*s Industrial
elatlons Division which had only remained under the CPI
aegis during the months of February and March 1918 before
it was transferred to the Department of Labor. Once there.
It was renamed Inquiry and Education, Information and
Education, and Manufacturer's Information. The name
changed, but the function did not. The issue remained the
industrial manpower of America—how to organize, inform,
and use it.
untie .>• i mm
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>tlnft a Federal tole
the passage of the gag law in its simplest feter-
pretatlon provided for penalties against federal officers
using backfire tactics on Congress* The quick fiscal
strangulation of the Committee on Fublic Information indi-
cates that it was not a congressional target with imposing
friends or supporters. When the law was first proposed in
House (February 28, 1919). action had already he^n ini-
tiated to cease all funding of the CPI. George Creel was
highly indignant that the profits from his committee's
activities had bean recovered into the Treasury and he had
been refused an appropriation to cover the final accounting* 2
Self-promotion of George Creel and subsequent revi-
sionists to the contrary, there was never a chance that the
CFI would be continued in any forra.^ Once the "war
emergency" was ended, the Justification for the primary
source of funds—the President's security fund—was ended*
Only legislatively approved and appropriation-supported
activities had hope of continuation.
As early as i*ay 191*. the Department of Labor sought
support for two new, war-related activities. They were the
I'nited States Employment Service (USES) under John B.
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Denamore and the Information and Education Service under
otrer tf« Babson. In the latter case, Babson was appear-
ing before the committee in order to secure an appro-
priation for a new and aaibitlous program of employer-
employee relations, since his movement to the Department
of Labor in 3arch 1916* he had operated as the head of the
u
•Manufacturers Information Division" under the OBI . He
had a staff of eicjht, including a man in charge of
"employment courses," and was paid a rather modest $2,500.
; he Labor Department hierarchy supported the new
information service. 5 However, their enthusiasm abated
under the hostility of the committee and on Kay 31# 1919*
Babson faced the committee alone. He requested a com-
piling division ( surplus/shortage of labor throughout the
United States), a general inquiry division, and an educa-
tion division, all at a cost of $283,000. However, as the
testimony developed, it became clear Babson had a further
project in mind. Claiming he could save the government
500 million to one billion dollars a year, he stated,
"Labor has got to be mobilized In some way or anotheri
labor has got to be mobilized systematically. *?
Systematic mobilization meant, firstly, a "definite
campaign of mobilization," and secondly a government-
maintained "honor record* on each of two million Industrial
workers (those "who have direct contracts" with the
a
government). This amounted to an efficiency rating for
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after the war. Bebson went on to amy If this were not done
we would be defeated or labor conscription would be
required.
The questioning turned to the practicality of the
matter and the congressmen* s patience wore thin. Chairman
Swagar Sherley (Democrat-Virginia) saldi
We have never been able to develop a sufficiently
intelligent central Government force to do it
^or^anize work efficiently^ for the Government in
its own work ... we have never yet developed the
intelligence and capacity inside the Government for
running the Governments own business, let alone
running everybody else's.
9
The testimony ended shortly after ftr. Babson allowed that
it would cost about five million dollars to carry out his
program* He did not get his appropriation! but he did get
his program in reduced form within the Department of Labor. 10
The comprehensive information system was implemented in the
hinterlands by the apparatus of the USSS." In his sym»
pathetic, 1919 biography of * 1111am B. Wilson, Babson states
the Information and Education Service was organized July 1,
1919 (after his committee appearance). rie does not refer
to the hearings and returns to the original Department of
Labor legislation as the statuetory authority for this
service. 12
The question of control of the information programs
of the Department of Labor had occurred the previous year,
1917* £ven the modest plans at that time had raised the
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Hearings on "Urgent Appropriations on Account of
War Expenses* 1913" commended Immediately upon the begin*
nlng of the 1918 fiscal year, July 191?« Kost agencies
sere seeking essentially modest Increases In clerical
staffs* office machinery and administrative assistance.
The Department of Labor appeared before the com-
mittee In the persons of Secretary of Labor *. L. * 11 son.
Chief Cleric Robert Watson, and Deputy Commissioner of Labor
Statistics Royal Meeker. The secretary requested authority
to move the officers, clerks, and employees of the Division
of Information, Bureau of Immigration to the newly desig-
nated QUI under the Department of Labor In Washington,
D« C. ^ 7he secretary* s rationale stipulated that since
immigration had decreased upon the outbreak of war, there
was less need to provide Information at the ports of entry.
Also, the rapid expansion of war-related industry required
an improved system of internal communication within the
country. Mechanics, steel-fitters, shipyard workers,
electricians, etc. needed to be shifted and informed of
Industry's needs to increase war production efficiency.
The committee chairman. Congressman J. J. Fitzgerald,
a Tammany Democrat of New York (and a superb parliamentarian
according to "Champ*1 Clark), Inquired whether this would
"in effect create a national employment service.? r.
Wilson replied in the affirmative and stated h«* would have
twenty-one directors in the field.
^
Questioning by the Appropriations Committee
*st •
rlmraO
. ; vtf m'
neventually turned to nayraond Crist, of the iiureau of
Naturalization. The bureau had requested ^150,000 for
travel expenses of examiners. Crist said that there was
great demand froia all over the United states for the assis-
tance of these examiners in the teaching of candidates for
naturalization. The committee chairman challenged this
assertion and stated that the seemingly spontaneous grass-
roots demand was in fact stimulated by the federal bureau.
He introduced a Bureau of Naturalization form letter to
chief examiners dated April 191? into the record. The
second paragraph began
In order to secure this money /the 1150,000 travel
expenses/ it will be necessary for you and your exam*
iners in a judicious and discreet way to prevail In
person and not by letter on local influences, such as
superintendents of schools, judges of courts, clerks
of courts, and others, and have them write or telegraph
their representatives and Senators in Congress to
appear before the Members of the Appropriations
Committee of the Senate and House. . • *5
Chairman Fitzgerald demanded the list of local officers so
influenced, and roundly condemned the practices
i this estimate was submitted to Congress In April,
and immediately upon its submission the chief of your
bureau sent that letter to every examiner in the field
starting them to interviewing and appealing to the
Judges and other persons that they though might have
some influence with Hembers of Congvaa to pester them
with letters and telegrams about the Inadequate appro-
priations made for this, without any information on
their part whatever} an attempt to create a furor here
because something had been neglected in connection




he United States Employment Service and Politics
The need for some form of public employment service
was first recognized by the nation's cities. «ew York City
had begun the first service In IB 34 end Sen ranclsco
founded offices In 1868. In 1890, prodded by the Municipal
Labor Congress of Cincinnati, five Ghlo cities founded
offices. In 1?93# far west cities such as Seattle, Spokane,
and Takoma responded to growing local pressure ' and
established municipal offices.
In 1907 the Bureau of Immigration, then under the
Department of the Interior, founded a Division of Information
*to meet the problem of oversupply of immigrants in port
cities." Congress refused funds for field offices in sev-
eral cities and the only one authorized was that at Ellis
Island. 18
Shortly after the inauguration of the * 11 son
Administration in 1913# the bureaus of immigration and
labor were transferred from the old Department of Commerce
and Labor to form the nucleus of the new Department of Labor.
Congress was reluctant -to advance funds for a national
employment service or Indeed for any nation-wide functional
agency to deal with labor problems. M department eluded
this restriction by establishing employment zones under
the immigration Inspectors in the various states.
Washington (1*0, California (14), and Texas (10) received
the highest number of offices. *?






Labor by Congress for the 1915 fiscal year was one-third
what was requested. In the absence of appropriated funds
and specific legislative authority, the departaent went
ahead and issued directives for the creation of a USES on
January 3, 1918* o finance the operation the President
provided $825,000 froa his national defense and security
fund. 2 ** Their position was that legislative authorization
existed in the language of the department's original, 1913
charter, "to foster, promote and develop the welfare of
wage earners, to iaprove their working conditions, and to
advance their opportunities for profitable employment. A
There the legislative issue regained for the remain-
der of the war. rhe war emergency powers of the executive,
the centralization of power in the hands of the various
departments and boards, and the military necessities pro-
vided the momentum which swept the nation along, with the
Armistice and the congressional elections in November 1913,
conditions changed quickly. Any previous consensus was
quickly forgotten as politics resumed with a vengeance.
Congress moved to cut off appropriations and information
functions simultaneously*
The USES appropriation for the fiscal year 1919
was carried in the Sundry Civil Mil which was still before
the House during February 1919* Monies for the past activi-
ties (that is, fiscal 191B) of the USES were in the Third
Deficiency Appropriation Act also before Congress in
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reduced or eliminated In the Sundry Civil Llll. A rider
requiring all government duplicating to be done at the
Government Printing Office was attached to the sane bill. 22
The Sundry Bill was signed Into law March 1, 1919- he gag
rider was attached to the Deficiency Bill* That bill was
passed by the House otf February 28, 1919t however , It was
filibustered and died In the Senate March 4, 1919. Xhe
Deficiency £111 was reintroduced after the convening of the
special session In Hay and passed with the gag rider
attached. 2 '
The administration did not shrink from the struggle
with Congress. In late February, the President called for
a conference of governors and mayors in Washington, D. C,
March 3~^« Although the League of rations and the Versailles
Treaty were the most newsworthy issues, the domestic front
was not forgotten. :he washing-tor. lost reported!
The intimation is given that he ^President *ilson7
has some Ideas for cooperation between federal and
State and municipal government looking to give
employment to idle men. Doughboys returned to find
jobs held by women and flat feet men. ere are
350,000 out of work. 2**
It was an angry group of governors and mayors who
assembled in the capltol. rhey condemned Congress for
falling to pass the appropriation bills and the executive
for falling to provide policy leadership. Colorful Hayor
olph of San Francisco charged that the government had
failed to provide leadership. "Congress has adjourned, the
President has gone to Paris, and the vice president to








Secretary of Labor William &• Wilson had not
adjourned. He addressed the conference and raised a
spectre which would be used repeatedly In the future. IM
destructive strives In Seattle* Washington! Butte, Sontanai
and Lawrence* Massachusetts, were neither economic nor
industrial in origin. They were political attempts to set
up Soviets in the United states. 2" The Seattle general
strike was much in the headlines. It brought Kayor Die
Hanson to national prominence and served to complicate the
labor situation without clarifying very much. 2?
The AFL, which represented almost all the organized
unions In the tnlted States, had strenuously avoided associa-
tion with the radical Socialists and the I**'. In the east
and midwest, th'\s program was not exceptionally difficult.
However, in the far West, the radical strain ran much
deeper. -any of the laboring men were in fact Americans of
several generations. Their westering had been motivated by
a native American radicalism. Accordingly, the strength of
the IWW was located in the West. 28
As the war began, the shipyards of Portland, Seattle,
and lacoma were expanded considerably. The construction of
shipping case under the firect control of the governments
Emergency Shipping Corporation. Production accelerated
sharply and with it a demand for skilled labor. In Seattle,
that skilled labor formed closed shops. " A Central Labor
Council was established to represent all the craft unions of








Its own weekly newspaper, the Seattle b'nlon ^scord . The
paper was edited by £• B. Ault and its offices were loca-
ted in the Seattle Labor Temple. 3°
The Central Labor Council struck a more militant
line than the AFL throughout the war. Labor was in an
advantageous position because of the continuing demand for
the skilled craftsmen needed in the yards. In most cases,
disputes were resolved through the federal mediation
machinery of the *ar Labor Board. During the war, the
council accepted federal mediation without conceding the
decisions or the board to be binding upon them. :he issue
came to a head on January 31 • 1919 when the council, rejec-
ting the adjudication of the War Labor Board, called a
general strike. ^1 the Secretary of Labor characterized the
strike as an attempt to set up Soviets in the United states.
Wayor Ole Hanson was described in heroic terms for his resis-
tance to Bolshevism.'2 he offending evidence cited by
other newspapers and the government was an editorial from
the 'Jnion hecord of February 3» 1919* The editorial stated
the objectives of the strike were political and led down a
"road that leads Ko One Knows Where." 33
Congress Insisted that the OB0 was deeply involved
with the union movement in Seattle. In 1918, reports had
been published that Midwest offices of the Employment
Service were refusing to accept applicants for Seattle Jobs
unless they could show proof of union membership.^ The











practice* W* 5. Wilson contended it would be unrealistic
and cruel to enlist non-union labor who would arrive on
the West Coast and then be forced to join unions*
The Union record provided a good press for the
USES, During February and March, when the regular appro-
priation was before the Congress, there ware eight stories
favoring the service* he articles and stories ranged from
straight news concerning the Congressional action to attacks
on congressmen and senators for their opposition. ie
Union Hecord wade clear that they favored a federal system
of labor exchanges, feared civil disorder if unemployment
was not checked, and damned Congress for failing to act on
the fourteen million dollar proposal for a permanent service*
"Senators and Representatives should be notified officially
by unions to continue v.. . .S* . * . workers, write!" 35
Perhaps the most revealing article appeared
February 20 as "Gossip from Washington" by "Anise." am
article contained an interview with a USES official, F. A*
ilcox. After a discussion condemning the private labor
exchanges and unsatisfactory approaches to unemployment,
the Interviewer challenged Mr. Silcox in a friendly way*
"It*8 getting harder and harder, isn't it, for the govern-
ment to stay on the fence between capital and Labor?"
Mr. Silcox replied, "Strictly speaking," he smiled, "it
can # t be done." 56
Crosvenor Clarkson, Director of the Council of







Conference The CND staff wee still In existence in Kerch
1919 end striving to appear neutral in the struggle between
the Congress and the executive. The CND was coordinating
voluntary employment placement through the remaining local
councils of defense, clarkson claimed to have organized
1 # 850 such voluntary organizations in a letter to the
Appropriations Committee Chairman • Swagar 3herley February 5»
1919. ^ He noted the remarks of Seattle representative
ftilllsm Figgott's eddressi "Forget yourselves and politics.
The evil of our whole situation is this country has been the
desire of men to hold public office. "^
The March conference failed to accomplish anything
except a bad press for the administration. Accordingly
,
the Secretery of Labor called another* to the specific point
of the employment service. The conference was held
April 23-25, 1919t "to discuss the subject of e National
Employment Service in cooperation with states and munici-
palities, and to project a program for legislation."^
There were sixty-eight attendees from the various state
employment agencies, including ten repress*tatlves of the
federal office in Washington, D. C. ° A draft bill (to
become H.R. ^305) was produced. Congressman John I. olan
(Democrat-California) introduced the bill and hearings
were scheduled before a Joint Senate-House Committee June 19»
1919.*1
Colncidentally, the AFI/s annual convention was








Samuel Gonspers delivered the keynote speech end raised the
Issue of Socialist—Communlst-I** radicalism affecting the
jobless and the demobilized soldiers* A drum beat of
publicity was maintained in the magazine press*
It would be consistent to assume that If the USES
was In fact agitating for political support among civic
and labor organizations, there would be evidence of this
activity in the press* Walter Lippmann*s treatment of
•The Nature of News* Is relevant* Speaking on the subject
of very complex events, he said in 1921:
• • • the news on these subjects is bound to be debat-
able, when it is not wholly neglected. . « • Ihey do
not take shape until somebody investigates, or some-
body publicly, in the etymological meaning of the wort,
makes an issue of them*
Ihis is the underlying reason for the existence of
the press agent *^2
Ihe ;'ew epubllc did not take a strong position on
the specific issue of the USES* In an article by Arthur
ac anon, ".he Crisis of Demobilization," the prospect of
cancellation of the government's service to returning sol-
diers was viewed in terms of a potential for civil disorder.
He concluded that the nation "cannot afford to leave a
single expedient untried."** 3
he Survey * "an experiment In cooperative journalism,
published several accounts of the troubles of the ON . The
magazine was a cooperative weekly venture drawing upon a
wide range of correspondents from Jane Addams to Albert
Lasker. indited by veteran progressive Paul r. Kellogg, the
February 8 issue published an article titled, " rhe Attack








the article Justified the service's function under the
departmental charter of proactlng and fostering the wel-
fare of workers* The lineage of the Mn was traced to the
Labor Policies Board and Its chairman Felix Frankfurter.
In April, Devlne followed with "ihe *•!••« Analysis and
Forecast." Ee reported the troubles of the service and
concluded that the Washington staff was indeed too large
and inefficient .^>
One magazine with a radically different point of
view was Life and Labor
.
edited by Hrs. Raymond Hoblns,
wife of the controversial Bed Cross official* A Chicago
publication of the National women* s Trade Union League of
America, the magazine owed more to Jane Addams and Hull
Bouse movement than it did to the AFL.*° The April issue
carried four stories concerning the USES. he last story
commented
t
Cue to the failure of the last Congress to pass the
urgent deficiency appropriations bill, the Federal
employment service bureaus have been compelled to
cut down their forces 80 per cent. Ihls reduction went
Into effect Harch 22. The order limiting the employ-
ment service of the government urged all labor
organizations, state and municipal authorities, welfare
organizations and chambers of commerce to continue to
work as far as possible.**?
One magazine with a special public was The federal
h&nloyee . published monthly by the National Federation of
Federal Employees since August 24, 1916. One story, "The
United States Employment Service, A General Overview"
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D. «• Reynolds* Kajor stories appeared in the June issue,
one by Assistant Secretary of Labor Louis P. Post, and one
by the Director General of the USES, J. B. Densaore, Who
said, "A nation-wide employment system is a more important
right of the citizens of a democratic country than are




lhe Federal employee did not print any coverage of
the ?ag amendment* Instead, it concentrated coverage on the
positive need of the USES and it attacked the employment
service's main enemy, Congressman Thomas Blanton of Texas.*?
His role In the controversy will be covered later.
ihe business point of view was well represented by
Industry . The magazine was a semi-monthly edited by Henry
Harrison Lewis and published in Washington, D. C. It styled
itself as an interpreter of industrial progress. Industry
came to life on December 1, 1913 and immediately began
attacking the employment service. ihe issue of January 1,
1919 ohronicled the history of the Department of Labor and
accused the USES of being a "promoter of Unionism . "5° The
story detailed pro-union activities of examiners in
ftuskegon, Michigan. On January 15t the magazine accused
the Director General of the USES, Densmore, with interfering
with the processes of Justice In the San Francisco District
Attorney's office. "Interference by the Federal Government"
implicated the leadership of the Department of Labor in a





charged the department with Illegal lobbying. On Warch 1,
the page one lead story associated the USES with labor
propaganda and said the entire unemployment problem could
not be understood because of that propaganda.
Some action should be taken by Congress to prevent
placeholders using public funds for perpetuation of
their jobs* he news are filled with statements 1 . .
someone paid for the thousands of telegrams which
deluged Congress. :e Post Office Department paid
for carrying franked letters for the same purpose.
The taxpayer* In the ultimate analysis pays. • • • ™
This story appeared in the March 1 Issue and Representative
Good had offered his amendment February 28.
The new 66th Congress convened on May 19* On
June 1, the lead story of Industry printed a resolution of
the National Industrial Conference Board (representing
20,000 manufacturing corporations) denouncing the USES as
- incompetent , extravagant and inefficient."" The second
story printed the gag rider verbatim and stated the amend-
ment had corns from the Appropriations Committee on Kay 28.
It had, in fact, been originally proposed and passed on the
floor of the 65th Congress Bebruary 28.5** Further, It was
offered on the floor for the second time Kay 28, not In
committee. In the same issue, there was a story citing
the opposition of the National Association of Employment
Managers and the Southern Hetal Trades Association.^
The magazine then shifted its attention to the
hearings of the Joint committee on Labor for the Kenyon-
Nolan Bill. This bill proposed legislative authority for a
permanent, national employment service, stories attacking
-
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the bill appeared June 15 (two), July 1 (two), July 15
(three), August 1 (two), end August 15*
Hearings on the Kenyon-Kolan Bill considered two
Senate bills and the above mentioned House bill. The USES
had been eliminated as a duly authorized agency for fiscal
1919 when It was eliminated froa the Ounriry :.ill in Karen.
It still had a hope of survival in the Third Deficiency
Bill pending in Congress or through passage of any of the
bills before the Joint Labor Committee.
Two bizarre incidents developed which raised fears
of unchecked and irresponsible federal government inter-
ference in local affairs* Both cases were used against
the NO and its officers.
The Blanton case involved USES-prepared editorials
placed in Texas newspapers* tfie articles were used to
highlight Elanton's opposition to the government's employ-
ment policies* Department of Labor funds were used for the
traveling expenses of USES operatives in Blanton* s Texas
district* Lastly, Blanton presented evidence that the
UF<53 was promoting the AFL-affiliated Federal Employees
Union among all foewmraent workers. ^6
Congressman Blanton of Texas was an implacable for
of the USES. He was not a member of the Appropriations
Committee and his attacks upon the service occurred on the
floor of the House and before the Joint Labor Committe.
Immediately following Congressman Good's proposed gag
amendment on February 28, he announced his support and
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showed telegrams he had received fro* labor unions. $7 in
May, after the special session had convened, he tempor-
arily killed even the meagre |2?2#000 deficiency appro-
priation for the service by subjecting It to a point of
order as new legislation.^
Under the yules of the House, an Issue carried In
an appropriation which la construed to be -new legislation"
can be returned to committee by a single member* s raising
a "point of order" and being upheld by the Speaker."
Blanton succeeded In delaying the USES appropriation In
this manner. Xhe same maneuver could have been used against
ongmeaaman Good's gag rider, which he admitted was subject
to a point of orderi however, no one raised an objection.
This implies that the House was in unanimous agreement
(of those present) on both occasions that the amendment
passed.
Blanton was a former judge from Abilene, Texas.
Ha held ranching interests in that area. He served in the
65th and five succeeding Congresses before resigning to
run unsuccessfully for the vSenate In 1928. He returned to
Washington with the 71st Congress in 1930 and served until
defeat in 1936. He died on hia Texas ranch In 1957. 60
Besides fighting the QMml on the floor of the
House, Blanton was a colorful witness before the Joint
Senate-House Labor Committee hearings on the Kenyon- olen
Bill for a permanent national employment service. He pro-
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employees to Join the ational Federation of Federal
Lmployees. * He produced letters end editorials from the
Can Antonio express which alleged that the local U3E5 head*
K. «. Levis* was calling for his defeat.* 2
The issue of organized labor was a particularly
Intense one in Texas. When an unskilled labor shortage
developed early in the war, the USES was instrumental in
the importation of a large number of migrant Mexican workers*
This was not in Itself unusual since Texas has traditionally
depended upon both le#al and illegal Mexican labor, what
was unusual Is that President wilson had Issued an executive
order in June 1918 directing that all hiring of unskilled
labor be done through the USES* Further, the federal media*
tion of wartime labor disputes seemed to favor the cause of
organized labor. 3 this culminated in a deolsion of the
War Labor Board on February 21, 1919 against contractors
and for a carpenters union in San Antonio."^ Congressman
Blanton saw the unionization of south Texas through the
agency of the federal USES and migrant Hexlcan laborers
as a future possibility.
The feisty congressman became something of a hero
to his constituents when Samuel Compers used the June 1919
AFL convention in Atlantic Beach as an occasion to attack
Blanton. The page one story was headlined "Compere Flays
31anton* and the union leader went on to say, "As time goes
on, Blanton will be eliminated or left at home as othere
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The 5an Antonio Express . which had used the USES
material attacking Blanton, printed none of the controveray
froa the floor of the House or the labor committee hearings.
On June 28, it did print USES Director General Densmore's
denial of Blanton' s charges before the committee. °^ ihe
story reported the adoption of Eouse esolution No.
225 • *t resolution called for an investigation of
Densmore's and the BUS'sl involvement in the San Francisco
trial of labor leader Tom tfooney.
The next evolution of this scenario occurred in
October 1919* In a long speech on the floor of the House,
John I. Nolan of California revealed that the Blanton
charges contained in the House resolution offered in June
{Bm Res. 225) were not only false but were the result of
an act of entrapment by Department of Labor employees.
olan then called for a censure of rlanton, asserting that
he was an agent of the National Association of Manufacturers,
he censure motion failed and for that matter so did the
Kenyon-uolan Bill.^7
If the Blanton case contained comic elements, the
Mooney case had elements of the tragic. Thomas J. Kooney
was one €t four labor leaders convicted of the 1916 San
Francisco Freparedness Day bombings that killed ten and
wounded forty, kooney and warren K. Billings were sen-
tenced to death. The case fragged on through the 1930* s,
involving the Supreme Court, a Presidential Commission,







What Is of concern is the actions of the Director General
of the USES, John £• Denssore.
Criticism of the USES was both general and specific.
As the House and Senate bills were referred to committee,
congressional criticism concentrated upon the ;.ooney case*
House Resolution 128 was adopted June 27, 1919 and referred
to Secretary of Labor Wilson. The resolution consisted of
three specific questions*
1. what connection in behalf of the Department of
Labor f if any, has John B. Densmore, now Director of
the United Hates Employment Service, had with the
case of Thomas J. Mooney, convicted in California of
crime, stating in detail the activities of said
Densmore concerning said case, and the expenses of
same itemized that were paid by the Government, and
upon what authority of law, attaching copies of all
reports concerning same made to the Department of Labor
by said John £• Densmore.
2. .hat connection in behalf of the Department of
Labor, if any, since the punishment of said 1 nomas J.
Mooney was commuted to life imprisonment, has any
employee of said Department of Labor had with the said
case of Thomas J. Mooney, stating such activities in
detail, the purposes thereof, the expense itemized in
connection therewith that has been paid or is to be
paid by the Government, and upon what authority of law,
attaching copies of all reports made to the Department
of Labor concerning said case?
3* What requests on the Department of Labor, if
any, have been made by a grand Jury or a court in
California for said John t, Densmore to appear in
California to give evidence, and what action concerning
same was taken by the Department of Labor?"
Secretary Wilson refused to release all the informa-
tion to Congress, specifically the financial records.
However, a copy of the Densmore investigation Mas attached
to the report. Densmore had initiated the investigation
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in his capacity as a former solicitor of the Labor
Department and the general authority of Immigration authori-
ties to Investigate and deport aliens. He stated in the
report that he had two tactical approaches to the investi-
gation! one open, the other secret*
The first was to select a number of special operatives,
start at the beginning, and conduct a searching and
thorough inquiry into every phase of the case, includ-
ing the antecedent incidents, past history of the
principals, the crime itself, and then, of course, the
actual handling of the case by the prosecution* In
an investigation of this scope and character it would
have been necessary to be clothed with the power to
summon witnesses and administer oaths, and it would not
have been long before the whole operation would have
been handicapped by the widest publicity.
The alternative plan was to proceed secretly, with
but two or three men, and make no move that would
attract attention, either from the prosecution, the
defense, or the corporate interests of the city of San
Francisco, ihls second and less spectacular method
had its drawbacks, which however, were more than bal-
anced by its obvious advantages. It was therefore
decided to work secretly. "9
Mr. rensmore went on to describe how more than two
months of careful and clever work was required to place a
dictaphone and the attendant problems of background noise,
etc. erbatim and reconstructed transcripts for the
period September 5» 1918 through October 26, 1918 follow,
the general conclusion of which was that the district
attorney had, in fact, framed ."ooney and his associates
by a oomblnation of bribery, perjury, and other unsavory
acts. Densmore concluded his report.
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The Issue Involved Is Immeasurably larger than the
city and county of San Francisco. On the day that the
State supreme court confessed that it was without
power In the premises the Issue became larger even
than the sovereign State of California. .he fact is
that in its true proportions it is an issue not un-
worthy to be ranked with the other great problems
arising out of the war now being waged for the rights
of man and the liberation of peoples.
with these facts uppermost in mind, it seems but
logical, in bringing this report to a close, to suggest
that it would be well within the province and privilege
of the Federal Government to devise some means by which,
without giving offense to the duly constituted and
honestly functioning authorities of the city and county
of San Francisco, these several defendants would be
assured of those rights before the law which are guar-
anteed by the Federal Constitution.?"
The Kenyon-Nolan Bill failed. In fact. It failed
in every succeeding Congress until 1932. Herbert Hoover
vetoed the bill that yean however, the much modified
legislation was finally signeddlnto law in 1933 by Franklin
Delano hoosevelt as the Wagner-Peyser Act.?* It did not
Include a OSES of far-flung proportions. Today's employ-
ment service is basically an information and classification
activity.
o hom the Spoils
The failure of the Kenyon-Kolan Bill and other
social justice bills was due to the overly zealous activi-
ties of subordinate officials in the Labor Department.
Secretary 4* 8. Wilson seemed sincerely regretful in his
report to Congress, and Densmore, shortly afterward, was
dropped from government service. However, the incidence of
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Babson. Long- before the Armistice they had recognized the
central fact that whoever controlled the information to
America's laboring class certainly influenced economic
policy. The managerial revolution had put a new premium
upon the man who could communicate to both labor and capital.
The mutual recognition of the changes led to a
jurisdictional dispute between the CPI and the Department
of Labor* It was essentially a controversy of appropria-
tions allocation and function. Creel insisted that his
committee was the single* central information source and
brought his former boes William L. Cheeary into the CPI to
take over the publicity of the Labor Department In the
spring of 1918. This aotivlty consisted of Issuing a
weekly labor letter. Creel stated his position In the June
1919 testimony to the Appropriations Committee.
When Hr. Bebson cane here his idea was to issue bulle-
tins to the manufacturers telling them how they should
regard capital. I thought my problems were sufficient-
ly delicate without adding those to my list, and I
transferred Br« &&bson to the Department of Labor.
Mr. Babson dees not release a single thing to the
press. 73
Babson was not technically concerned with press
releases. The information function with which he identi-
fied was on a loftier level than press releases. His
Information and Education Division was concerned with the
likes of W. H. Taft and Felix Frankfurter in the policy
sphere. Besides the ubiquitous USES, he had direct access









The organizational experience of the Council of
National Defense was duplicated within the Department of
Labor. Babson's very sympathetic 1919 biography of
William E. Wilson describes the organizational process.
The Presidents Mediation Commission had traveled the
United states from the summer of 191? to January 1918 • It
was led by William F. Wilson and Felix Frankfurter was
counsel.' After Inquiring into capital-labor conditions
throughout the United States, the commission submitted a
report to the President. The Secretary of Labor appointed
an advisory council for his department, composed of many of
the same men. The public, National Industrial Conference
Board (. ICB), APL composition formula was usod.?^ The
Advisory Commission (parent to the Advisory Council, and
mainly the same men), recommended a considerable expansion
of the department to Secretary Wilson Kerch 29» 1918.
?
6
President *oodrow Wilson confirmed the recommendations by
proclamation April 8, 1918, renaming the Advisory Council
the National War Labor Board (NWLB). Ihe functions of this
board were "to adjust labor disputes In fields of produc-
tion necessary to the effeotive conduct of the war.*??
Further, in order to coordinate the multiplying govern-
mental agencies dealing with labor, it was necessary to
create a War Labor Policies Board (MM) under Kr. Pelix
Frankfurter. Indeed, the "Government had become the
greatest employer in the country. -78
Like the CP1, the and the BULB were casualties
a*












of the economy drive following the Armistice. Unlike the
CFI» some of the employees were able to find a place In
the Department of Labor. Boger Babson coved toward taking
control of the Official Fulletln of the CPI. He began
publishing the Vfoltod Statee Bulletin as a commercial ven-
ture and continued to do so until 1920 when he merged It
with his other publications.^
This particular Issue became a cause celebre and
continued Into 1924. The report of Senator Smooths Joint
Committee on Printing presents the congressional view.
What Is Important Is that the storm had not yet broken In
Hay 1919 when the special session of Congress convened.
The Joint Committee began Its Investigating In August
1919. 80
George Creel resisted the foreclosure of his
committee's operations until the cause was hopelessly lost.
When he had contracted more trouble than he could handle
,
he transferred his domestic Information function to the
Labor Department, roger r*bson assumed the Official
bulletin while retaining his position with the department.
Even John b. Densmore received assets. £ary E. Shlek was
a clerk In the Service Bureau of the CPI. his bureau was
the central Information point for the entire federal
government from Kerch 19. 191B until the CPI demise. Creel
placed her with Densmore Harch 21, 1919. Densmore acknowl-
edged placing her and went on to Creel about his own plans
1






"I shall endeavor to raise funds, privately, to carry on a
public Information bureau In Washington, which will without
charge give disinterested information on Governmental
activities.- 91
Promotions. Politics* and Profits
It was not only the such-maligned CPI which was
embroiled In controversy. Department of Labor was
Involved In very fundamental Issues which the Congress did
not concede to be a proper sphere of activity for the
Labor Department*
he post-wsr economic situation was the paramount
Issue. Ihe relations between capital and labor, the
Implications of the managerial revolution, and the newly
realized potential of modern communications hsd political
Implications which could not be—and were not—Ignored.
Those men—George Creel, Carl Byolr, John Densmore, and
•loger Babson-who were most experienced In the Information
functions of the government were In the best position to
exploit the new conditions. If the wartime organizations
could be maintained and funded, those organizations could
continue centralized, federal direction of the nation.
Babson f s concluding remarks In the W. B. Wilson biography
address the principle of government ownership of the means
of production. New economic units were coming, the
question was In what form.












position following the war. Gold reserves, war debts, the
dismantling of the German, Austrian, and urklsh empires!
and startling increases in United States productive capa-
city propelled the country to economic preeminence. he
question was not "if* future prosperity, but "how much."
Accordingly, the econoaic issue was Intertwined with the
domestic political issue*
The position of the Wilson Administration was clear*
That position also included many attitudes and policies of
Theodore Roosevelt's Progressives and even the previous
policies of conservative Republicans. tf« . left's support
of the League of Nations, his participation of the NtfLL
,
and his whole-hearted support of unionization and collective
bargaining were symbolic of the change in attitudes. 2
The opposite view accepted the principle that there
would inevitably be price instability and great unemploy-
ment in times of great social change. hese fluctuations
of the business cycle were inevitable and public tampering
was only justified in times of emergency. * • . • There
was no general confidence that depression could be tempered
by government action without the risk either of eliminating
the self-corrective features of the cycle or simply making
things worse. w83
Joseph A. vSchumpeter, the Austrian economist and
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In all cases • . • recovery came of Itself . • but
this is not allt our analysis leads us to believe
that recovery Is sound only If It does come of itself.
For any revival which is Merely due to artificial
stimulus leaves part of the work of depressions
undone and adds to an undigested remnant of raalajust-
ment* new malajustaents of its own. 81*
iewed from the central tradition* the activities
of the CPI and the UKES were not merely in bad taste.
Their involvement in local issues was state-controlled
corruption of the political process. heir programs were
thinly disguised extensions of wartime propagandising with
the intent of changing the fundamental structure of
American life, worst of all* they were viewed as hypo-
critical self-promoters who used the rhetoric of reformers
for their own personal gain. Former speaker of the House
Joe Cannon* a junior member of the Appropriations Committee
in 1919, characterized the situation:
A good many camels got their noses under the tent
during the war Emergency and they are now crowding
their bodies in with an appeal to Congress that they
be consecrated as the government's own. . . . They
are spreading propaganda* much of it at government
expense* to create public sentiment in favor of their
permanent adoption 1 and a great many people try to
apply the old proverb that public money Is like
holy water—free to all who seek salvation. 85
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TURNING THE COUNTRY AROUND
General
The domestic political activities of the Committee
on Public Information (CPI) were covert as its director,
George Creel, protested that his committee was not involved
in partisan politics. The United States Employment Service
(USES) protested that its activities were above politics
and directed toward fundamental issues of social justice.
To the extent that these wartime agencies were refused
appropriations and their officers returned to private life,
their importance as governmental institutions receded. The
political debate remained; but, the retrospective view must
subordinate their lasting influence to more important
institutions. The CPI and the USES failed the basic
political test--they did not survive.
The War Department did survive. It was concerned
with the activities of all other departments and agencies
and, as in all previous wars, carried the brunt of contro-
versy and responsibility. Two main issues in early 1919
were demobilization and post-war military policy. Like
the other executive agencies, the War Department was under





That scrutiny soon exposed issues which would have profound
political implications.
Demobilization
The magnitude of potential problems can be quanti-
fied superficially. Friendly sources estimated organized
labor to be about four million workers. The Socialist
Party had polled almost one million votes in 1912. However,
there were more than four million Americans in arms. Of
2these, more than two million were overseas. Popular
perceptions of demobilized soldiers could not be sanguine.
Beginning with the Petrograd Soviets of soldiers and sailors
overthrowing the Kerensky government in 1917, the French
mutinies in the trenches in 1917, and finally the Sparticist
revolutionaries active in Germany, the public had good
reason to be apprehensive of large numbers of discontented
former soldiers.
The Armistice had caught the Administration largely
unprepared for demobbing. When plans were developed, they
were largely dependent upon war-time agencies such as the
USES, the War Industries Board (WIB) , and the National War
Labor Board (NWLB) . As Congress progressively cut appro-
priations for the special agencies, the responsibilities
for demobilization were shifted to local units and existing
executive departments. When the USES failed to receive an
appropriation, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker appointed
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Colonel Woods had an interesting war. A former New
York City Police Commissioner (1914-1918) of impeccable
Republican credentials, Woods was a Harvard graduate and
former reporter for the New York Evening Sun and had also
attended the University of Berlin. He married into the
J. P. Morgan family in 1916 and eventually became a direc-
tor of the Banker's Trust Company, the Colorado Fuel and
Iron Company, and a Trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation.
Woods began his government service with the CPI as
Associate Director for Foreign Propaganda in February 1918.
He was commissioned a colonel (Aviation) in March, promoted
to full colonel in August 1918, and served tbree months in
France— September through November 1918. He received the
Chevalier Legion du Honeur, the Distinguished Service Medal
and the British Companion to St. Michael and St. George;
was discharged in January 1919, and then assisted the
7Secretary of War to September 1919.
The War Department program was primarily a matter
of demobilizing as quickly as possible. As disorganized
and confusing as it seems in retrospect, this program was
effective. General Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff, used a
system of unit and geographical redistribution throughout
o
the country. By mid-February, more than one million had
_ 9
been discharged and another 305,000 embarked home from France.
-:
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The Post -War Army
There were three general positions concerning the
future of the U.S. Army in early 1919. All three involved
political, social and economic considerations which were
fundamental to questions of national policy. The options
were: (1) to return to 1916 levels of manpower and
organization, (2) to increase the size of the standing
army, or (3) to base all force calculations upon the idea
of Universal Military Training,
A return to 1916 levels had much to recommend it,
not the least of which was economy. Then, as now, person-
nel were the most expensive element in any organization.
For the legislators concerned, this was also the easiest
option. From the Congress's point of view, the 1916 level
was, in fact, the legal level. Anything above that number
was considered "war emergency" and the only substantive
issue was to determine when the "war emergency" situation
was over. This position held great congressional support
and several implicit assumptions were involved.
If the Armistice did, in fact, mark the end of the
war, those men drafted into the service or mobilized in
state national guard units were simply temporarily delayed
in their return to civilian life. Maintaining men in
uniform pending final signature of the Versailles documents
was at best a legalistic evasion, and at worst executive










An increase in the size of the standing army was
the position generally associated with General March and
12the General Staff. The figure most often mentioned was
500,000 and the Wilson Administration provided lukewarm
13
support for this option. The very untidy world situation
provided ample justification for such a force. However,
considering the world situation as a part of the equation
depended very largely upon acceptance of the assumption
that the U.S. would be involved militarily in international
affairs.
Military involvement was in fact the case at the
time. There were troops on the Archangel and Siberian
fronts as well as an occupation force on the Rhine. The
chaotic rush to mobilize in 1917 also recommended a force
of this magnitude. In short, current realities and the
immediate past dictated that immediate and total demobili-
zation was impossible.
The third position which came to prominence was the
idea of Universal Military Training. This concept did
not necessarily exclude or include either of the previous
two options. Deriving as it did from ancient ideas of the
citizen soldier, the minuteman, and the militia, it became
a precondition to the political debate. Simply stated, the












The Military Intelligence Service
What have become known as the propaganda hearings
of World War I had a curious history. The original inves-
tigation was a suspicion that German ethnics were using
brewing interests as covers for propaganda. In this
sense, German propaganda was an evil connected to intem-
perance. It became a criminal offense to serve liquor to
servicemen during the war. One of the principal campaigns
of Herbert Hoover's Food Administration was denying grains
to liquor industries.
Another common perception was that the Lenin-Trotsky
faction of Bolshevists were in fact German agents provoca-
18teurs. German complicity in returning Lenin to Russia
via the Finland Station, combined with theiT leftist program
to remove Russia from the war, provided proof enough of the
conspiracy to many. Hence the association of German
propaganda, brewing interests, and Bolsheviks eventually
led to conspiratorial theories involving anyone who opposed
the war.
Heated recriminations continued after the war,
exacerbated by Allied intervention in Siberia and the
Archangel area. Domestic agitation by the Socialist-IWW
faction in the U.S. was perceived as a threat to the
established political parties. An unfortunate coincidence
in Congressional hearings served to associate the Army's
Military Intelligence Service of the General Staff with







the increasingly political investigation of the Propaganda
19Subcommittee.
The deputy to the head of the intelligence section,
Colonel William Dunn, testified as spokesman before the
House Military Affairs Committee in January and sought
legislative authority to expand his section's peacetime
21
strength to 77 officers. Testimony shoved the pathetic
state of the section at the beginning of the war, when the
entire intelligence apparatus consisted of one officer and
22
one clerk. By war's end, the Washington office alone had
grown to 272 officers, most of them former professors and
23journalists. Colonel Dunn testified that the general
staff hoped to maintain 77 officers for various intelligence
24duties, one of which was domestic information collection.
At the same time, a former agent of Colonel Nicholas
Biddle's New York MI office was testifying before the
25Propaganda Committee. Archibald E. Stevenson, a New York
attorney, gave testimony which raised serious questions of
the proper functions of the Army's general staff and the
V'ar Department. Stevenson accused the foreign language
press of infiltration by German agents. Me specifically
identified the prestigious Staats-2eitung
,
published by
Heriaan Ridder's son, as a source of enemy propaganda.
Indeed, before he finished he indicted the entire New York
based liberal press. He also charged that a Brooklyn




















was a pro-German front. This implicated the current New
York City Mayor John F. Hylan, 26
Stevenson identified the causes of labor unrest for
the committee. Speaking of the railroad union's proposal
of government ownership of the rails, he defined syndicalism
for the committee: "With syndicalism is coupled 'propaganda
by deed' or 'direct action'; that is, the tactics of general
striVe and sabotage.
"
Stevenson's testimony ranged far and indicted numer-
ous individuals and organizations as pacifist, radical,
pro-German and pro-Bolshevik--all of which were considered
equally subversive. The Socialist mayoralty candidate,
Morris Hillquit, and his associates on the "People's
Council of America for Democracy and Peace," the National
Civil Liberties Bureau, including Amos Pinchot; and the
editors of the Dial, Public , and The Survey were major
targets. The Assistant Director of New York's Federal
Employment Service and a former Dean of Columbia Law School,
Dr. George W. Kirchwey; Charles A. Beard and the Rand school
itself; and especially Oswald Garrison Villard and John
Reed were also smeared, Fven the Department of Labor's
Immigration Commissioner, F. C. "owe, was indicted.
Stevenson was initially coy about providing the names, but
he relented eventually and entire lists were inserted into
the record. Senator Knute Nelson of Minnesota was a









number of Socialists have crept into the army of office-
rsholders in this country?"
The New York attorney's testimony concluded with
Committee discussion of a commission to study and investi-
gate the larger problem. Stevenson recommended a program
of counter-propapanda, deportation of alien agitators, and
legislation. * Senator Nelson stated: "You are aware that
we have big constitutional lawyers here, and that in
carrying on these reforms that you suggest we would run
up against the gospel of free speech?"
The Stevenson testimony was taken very seriously
in New York, of course. It was less serious in Washington
until Secretary of War Baker made it front pa<?e news by
disavowing Stevenson as an employee of Military Intelli-
31gence. This was followed by a gag order signed by the
Chief of Staff, General March. 32 The New York Times
reported "Silence Order Issued by Baker' and published the
text of the general order. The policy stated was that all
MI information was, firstly, confidential by its very
nature. Secondly, all requests for testimony or information
would be forwarded to MIS Washington for decision by the
Chief of Staff personally. 33
Baker was not technically incorrect. According to
Stevenson himself, he had originally been attached to the
Department of Justice. However, his actual government work













signed by Brigidier General Marlborough Churchill to prove
34it. Senator Lee S. Overman (Democrat-North Carolina)
kept the matter in the public eye by stating that the wit-
ness was in fact expedited to the committee by the War
Department December 17, 1918. ,; It is evident that the
Secretary of Kar did not familiarize himself with the
employees of his department or the work which was being
35done by the bureau of Military Intelligence."
Stevenson's function in all this is clear. Fe had
gotten his start in subversive investigations as Chairman
of Mayor John P. Mitchel's Committee of National Defense,
Committee on Aliens. He claimed to have established the
first bureau of translation of the foreign language press
in 1917. In the 1920's Stevenson became the legal
counsel to the >-ew York State Assembly's Lusk Committee
and figured prominently in the drafting of that state's
37
criminal anarchy legislation.
Besides the explicit association of "propaganda,
"
there were other connections of military intelligence with
the CPI. Most of George Creel's contacts with the War
Department were through the Military Intelligence Service.
One incident involved the assistant director of the New
York based Foreign Picture Service. In an undated letter
to then Colonel Churchill, Creel acknowledged the transfer
of draftee John Tuerk from training camp to duty with the








an enlisted man. The CPI chairman insisted that Tuerk be
transferred to the Military Intelligence Branch and com-
missioned a second lieutenant "because of the confiden-
3°
tiality of his work.' Other correspondence indicates
that Colonel Churchill did not relish his relationship with
Creel at all. However, it is apparent that the CPI had a
certain leverage through its operatives in foreign capitals.




Congressional opposition to the general staff's
army reorganization plans was also increasing by the end
of January. One of the most emotional issues raised was
the administration of military justice. Rightly or wrongly,
the issue was cast in terms of an authoritarian, draconian
and brutal exercise of power by regular officers over
citizen soldiers.
The Senate Military Affairs Committee announced
hearings on the Chamberlain Bill January 26, 1919. The
bill was intended to reform the existing Articles of War,
41passed in 1916. There were numerous rumors of excessive
penalties for supposedly minor military offenses. A major
part of the bill would change the function of the Judge
Advocate General and empower him to review courts-martial






JAG Enoch Crowder and the Chief of Staff insisted at the
time that only the President held the power to review or
grant clemency.
The Acting JAG, Brigadier General Samuel Ansell,
testified in favor of the Chamberlain Bill and in so doing
damned the existing system. In typically reported stories
headlined 'Courts-Martial Called Atrocious/* General Ansell
gave examples of men sentenced to forty years for refusing
to drill. 44
After the original sensationalism of the Acting
JAG's testimony, the issue devolved into an intramural
struggle over general staff, bureau and regular-national
guard control of military policy. In mid-February, the
controversy developed into the right of the soldier to
freedom of speech.
Congressman James Gallivan of ?fassachusetts , a
loyal, labor-oriented, Administration Democrat established
himself as an enemy of the regular army faction denoted as
45the 'Leavenworth clique." On February 2, he read into
tne Congress ional Record a letter signed by forty wounded
officers. The lengthy letter alleged that the regular
officers were an autocracy aligned against General Leonard
tfood and all National Guard and Reserves, that the Service
of Supply (SOS) was full of regulars while the front lines
were manned by reserves, and that when the fighting was
















the reserves were sent to Blois for "canning." The bitter
letter went on:
How many men above the rank of Capt. were wounded?
. . . scores of men were sacrificed because the
officers in command were ambitious for promotion and
ordered needless advances . . . our part in the war
was a success not because of the skill of our high
command, but in spite of it. . . . We have known this
all along, but what could we do? We were muzzled - 6 . .
you're the champion to take the muzzle off ....
These events provided powerful support to congres-
sional critics of the Administration. The court-martial
issue refused to j?o away and matters were not improved when
Baker announced Ansell was beinp reverted to his pre-war
47
rank of lieutenant colonel as of March 10, 1919. Despite
assurances that the reversion had nothinf to do with the
controversy, Congressman James Could of New York stated
Ansell was punished for testifying "in that he answered a
summons which he couldn't decline and told the Congress of
the U.S. the truth about a matter which it was clearly the
duty of Congress to inquire into."
Ansell 's replacement, Brigadier General E. A.
Kreger, had the same date of rank as Ansell. He reported
for duty at the Washington JAG office after an unsuccessful
trip to France and an attempt to secure the court martial
49
records of the AEF. General John J. Pershing would not
provide them. JAG Enoch Crowder returned from a trip to
Cuba and accused Ansell of political maneuvering. Crowder,
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colleague Ansell had not objected to the stringency of the
punishments when he had helped draft the bill in 1916.
Crowder went on to say the fault, if there was any fault in
the war situation, was with Congress. The public debate
over the issue was silenced when the matter was turned over
51
to the Inspector General for investigation.
These incidents, taken in conjunction and occurring
during early February, led to a floor action which is
fundamental to the consideration of the ga£ law. It should
be borne in mind that the gag law was first proposed on the
floor of the House February 28, 1919, and in conjunction
52
with an appropriation bill.
The General Staff Rebuffed
There was a great deal of legislation by amendment
to appropriation bills. The Third Session, 65th Congress,
was scheduled to adjourn March 4, 1919. The time element
was such that heaTin^s and legislative drafting were im-
practical, especially since the 65th, the 'War Congress"
had been a lame duck since November 4, 1918. Accordingly,
there was a rush to adjourn. And yet, the substantive
issues of the economy, the future size of the army and the
control of communications could not be avoided. Where
possible, a congressional consensus could attach riders to
appropriations bills which would express the will of Con-








executive with the funds for the nation's business.
The House session of February 15th was a stormy one.
The Committee of the Whole was considering the highly
controversial Army Appropriation Bill in detail and contro-
versy. Because of the legislative log jam, the War Depart-
ment and the Military Affairs Committee hoped to have the
General Staff's 500,000-man army pass as an amendment to
53the Appropriation Bill. The entire appropriation (except
14 million dollars for the National Guard) was delayed by
successive charges against the War Department frora the
floor. Leonidas C. Dyer (Republican-Missouri) accused the
Department of lying. Henry D. L. W. Flood (Democrat
-
Virginia) accused officers in the Washington area of
abusing the use of government vehicles and had a prohib-
itive amendment adopted. James R. ?>fann (Republican-
Illinois) accused the Army of discrimination against
lower-ranking officers and their wives. Joseph H. Moore
(Republican-Pennsylvania) damned the conditions at Brest.
William R. Green (Republican- Iowa) demanded the War
Department get something done about the Brest debarkation
camps. Royal Johnson (Republican-South Dakota), a former
member of the AFF, called the military justice system an
outrage and warned that the soldiers would remember in
1920. He said he understood why the Administration had
failed to support the doughboy- -no son or relative of











Harold Xnutson (Republican-Minnesota) decried the Prussian-
izing of the Array and said, "Let us have a little of that
'pitiless publicity' of which the Democrats spoke with so
much feeling in 1912 and which we have seen so little of
since March 4, 1913." The only defense of the Administration
offered was by Scott Ferris (Democrat-Oklahoma) , floor
manager of the Appropriation Bill. He stated the abuses of
the system were older than the current Administration and
warned that it was harmful to preach hate and despair of
54the government.
Following the clerk's reading of a $100,000 item
for rent of buildings in the District of Columbia, Thomas
D. McKeown (Democrat- Oklahoma) offered his amendment and
the following exchange ensued.
Mr. McKeown offers the following as a new paragraph:
After the period at the end of line 7, page 40, insert
the following: "That no part of the appropriations
contained in this act shall be available if the War
Department shall permit any officer to make orders,
rules, or regulations prohibiting officers or enlisted
men from communicating information of conditions in
the Army to United States Senators or Members of the
House of Representatives."
Mt. Dent. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the point of
order on the amendment. 55
Hubert Dent, Chairman of the House Military Affairs
Committee, was the Democratic Party's accountable man for
military policy. His reservation of the point of order
gave him the initiative toward commitment or rejection of
the proposed amendment. He asked that it be reread while










the hearings, he retracted all objections.
Mr. Dent. I withdraw the point of order.
Mr. Stafford. I wake the point of order, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. McKeown. Will the gentleman reserve the point
of order? This is a limitation upon this appropriation
bill and I do not think it is subject to the point of
order.
Mr. Stafford. Mr. Chairman, there is no question
it is in the form of a limitation, but it is further
true that it infringes upon the authority now vested
in the executive officers of the Government. They have
authority now to provide regulations under existing
law. There is nothing more fundamental in the legis-
lative precedents in the House than that if a limita-
tion, though negative in form, is actually affirmative,
so that it interfered with the discretion of an
executive officer, or with any authority which the
executive officer under existing law now has, it is
legislation in fact, and thereby comes under the
inhibition that it is legislation upon an appropriation
bill.
Stafford had no reason to oppose the amendment other
than the issue of riders on appropriation bills. It was
bad business and subject to much abuse. The Republican
minority leader answered him:
Mr. Mann. Mr. Chairman, the amendment as offered
does not require any executive branch of the Government
nor anybody in the Army to do any positive thing. If it
directed the War Department to do something which it
was not authorized now to do, it would be legislation no
natter what the form might be, but this is a mere with-
holding of the money appropriated if certain conditions
exist. Vf have a right to prescribe the conditions so
long as it does not direct the executive department to
do something it is not now authorized to do . . . Why,
certainly we may make an appropriation direct to an
officer, and he may expend it as he pleases if we stop
there under the law, but we can put a direction at the
end of that that it shall not be spent in a certain
way. That does not direct him how he shall spend it.
That limits his authority as to how he shall spend it












Jar.es R. Mann, soon to be the power in the Committee
on Committees of the Republican 66th Conpress, was a former
Joe Cannon lieutenant and the most subtle parliamentarian
in Congress. This exchange foretold a policy of Congres-
sional domination of the federal government. He returned
the floor to the amendments author.
Mr. McKeown. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the
committee, I think this amendment ought to be put on
this appropriation bill. You receive letters, and so
do I, and at the end of the letter you will find this
statement: "Do not let my name be used; do not let
them know I wrote you. If you do, it means the pen-
itentiary for me. ,! I say it is time that this Congress
went on record or took some action to protect the men
who can not protect themselves and who can not be heard
except through the Congressmen who represent their
districts. Gag rule is un-American. We put the
soldiers in the service and put them there by law.
This Congress passed a law that took them whether they
wanted to go or not. You can not hear from them and
get the facts from them, because they are afraid they
will be jerked before a court-martial. You have
already seen and heard the record as to what takes
place in a court-martial proceeding under the present
methods. Every soldier and every officer in the Army
of the United States ought to have the right to go to
his Congressman or his Senator and tell him the condi-
tions without fear of being brought up before any
board and dealt with. And I hope that this amendment
will carry. [Applause]
Mr. Shallenberger. Mr. Chairman, I would like to
give the gentleman from Wisconsin [Stafford] the infor-
mation the committee has on this subject to which he
was referring.
Mr. Stafford. I have obtained that information by
reading the hearings of the committee, and I withdraw
the reservation of the point of order. ...
The amendment offered and accepted did not apply
to the quartermaster's buildings. It modified paragraph
CO







at the General Staff and the War Department. Represent-
ative Dent, as Chairman of the House Military Affairs
Committee, had the responsibility for the bill on the floor.
No matter what the substantive issue, he was ultimately
responsible for the bill in the Mouse. Dent would answer
to the Democratic Party and the VTilson Administration, lie
could object to the amendment by raising the point of order
and sending the amendment back to committee, lie did
neither because he opposed Baker and the General Staff.
Earlier, January 16, 1919, he had stated he "was not in
sympathy with Baler's policy of organizing the army now,




Representative Stafford obviously did object upon
the substantive issue of legislating by amendments to
appropriation bills. However, he too withdrew the objection
after seeing the articles. The emotional issues raised by
the court-martial abuses made it difficult for any congress-
Bsan to oppose the amendment.
The political issue was becoming clearer with these
congressional actions. The Washington Post concluded that
the restrictions were anti-Baker and his effort to
restructure the Army. Whatever the reason, the Military
Affairs Committee shelved the 500,000-man Army issue by
62instructing Dent to seek a special rule. This meant









The General Staff's enlarged Army plans failed, although
the issue would be fought over again in the September 3-
64November 12, 1919 Army Reorganization Hearings. The die
was cast in February 1919.
The issue of removing the gag from military person-
nel went considerably further than the Ansell-Crowder row
or the unseemly activities of Archibald Stavenson. Repub-
lican congressmen had a vested interest in associating the
General Staff with the Wilson Administration. Any specific
abuses which occurred in the Army system could be laid at
the door of the arrogant and Prussianized general staff.
Nepotism, favoritism and ineptitude were charged against
the Secretary of War. Writers came forward to claim they
had exposed the disciplinary system as early as 1914.
Once the General Staff and the Secretary of War
were linked and discredited, the UMT issue became less
significant. Congressional perception of UMT under a
strong, centralized Department of War was, in effect,
continued conscription, Army reassurances to the contrary.
On the other hand, UMT under state control was what had gone
before, a national guard system.
The one great imponderable in February 1919 was the
leader of the AEF, Pershing. All American wars had pro-
duced either a president or a strong candidate from the
ranks of military leaders. The AEF commander was a prime













Congressional and press criticisms were directed at the
Wilson Administration explicitly. However, implicit in
every criticism was a possible failing of the AEF and
Pershing. 67
Waiting in the wings was a third warrior, General
Leonard Wood. His political contacts went back to the
preparedness campaign of 1916. He was considered the
patron saint of the National Security League, the American
Defense Society, and the American Legion. As early as
December 1916, he had been rebuked by Secretary of War
Baker for publicly supporting UMT. Wood was an early target
of a War Department "muzzle order" in February 1915. By no
means was he out of political contention in early 1919,
delivered the memorial address for Theodore Roosevelt at
the Kansas City Chamber of Commerce meeting February 9,
1919. One opinion has it that Senators Medill McCormick
and Henry Cabot Lodge prematurely adjourned the 1920
Republican convention (when Wood was leading) and rushed to
the "smoke- filled room" to forestall a Wood victory.
Conclusion
The General Staff became identified with the
Administration prior to the recess of the 65th Congress on
March 4, 1919. That meant that any national policy which
the General Staff mipht fashion was inevitably politicized.





d'etre of the large standing army similarly fell apart. The
case made for a large arwy to fight the Central Powers could
not be indefinitely sustained. The more the Administration
predicated the League and the Peace upon the presence and
support of a large American Array, the more the increasing
Balkanization of Europe militated against the same standing
Army. There were no longer any European military threats.
The domestic situation compounded the problem. In
the euphoria of victory, the participants tended to be awed
by the sheer magnitude of the American effort. Memoirs
cite soldiers shipped, tons amassed, ingots stacked and
organizations streamlined. This efficiency, in many cases,
was precisely the problem.
For many years, the intellectual leaders of the
country had deplored the excesses of large, corporate
capitalism. The rauckrakers and various reformist groups
had associated the U.S. Congress with large, powerful
economic interests frustrating mass desires for social
justice legislation. Judicial and legislative relief for
social ills seemed increasingly remote. Suddenly, with the
declaration of war, the reformers embraced the robber
barons. An Administration which had fastidiously avoided
even seeming to prepare for industrialized war was increas-
ingly staffed by industrialists.
It seems reasonable to infer that there was more to
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Criticism of the General Staff was cast into stereotypes
calculated to stimulate traditional American anti-
authoritarianism. There were few votes to be gained by
identification with large governmental agencies. Among
other things, there were certainly a multitude of unpleasant
encounters with petty bureaucrats --four-minute men, selec-
tive service boards, food and fuel priority setters and the
omnipresent bond salesmen. It is reasonably safe to assume
that most Americans willingly submitted to the required
regimentation so long as the image of the enemy Hun was
upheld. But the incredible shambles of Europe in 1919 made
a mockery of the lofty Wilsonian rhetoric. The 1919 elec-
tions, the inability to reach a peace, and the developing
economic strife called into question the very competence
of the government.
The Mann-Cannon faction continued to exploit the
growing disillusionment by linVing incompetent administra-
tors to expensive and controversial programs. There were
certainly enough programs to discredit. By forcing the
special session to convene in May, the standpatters gained
a forum. In the many pending appropriation bills, they
found a vehicle for their program. With the President and
his staff in Europe, the opposition was leaderless and
demoralized. When Mann gained control of the Committee on


















The most conventional judgment of that decade is
the one which links the rise of the reactionaries and the
accompanying rejection of the League to the conditions
which produced Iiitler and Mussolini. This interpretation
became an article of faith for enlightened, liberal
internationalism. Whether true or not, such speculation is
academic.
The reaction engendered by the Wilson Administra-
tion's conduct of the war was an entirely legitimate
political exericse. That Administration's programs failed
because of an arrogant disregard of the Congress. More
fundamentally, the programs were constructed and promoted
in such a way as to entirely bypass Congress as an institu-
tion. The program promoters were not dishonorable or evil
men. However, equally honorable men could disagree with
the means as well as the ends of the numerous programs.
The examination of the large issue has developed
into seeming paradox. The House of Representatives used
the vehicle of a rider to an appropriation bill to restrict
federal officers from communicating with congressmen on
February 28, 1919. And yet, two weeks previously, the
House had attached a rider to an appropriation bill manda-
ting that officers and enlisted men not be restricted from
communicating with those same congressmen.
The paradox is only apparent. The current perspec-
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uninterrupted growth of federal and military bureaucracies.
A large, centralized federal government is assumed today.
Despite the experience of World War I, that was not an
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GETTING THE CAKELS OUT OF THE TENT
The House of representatives reached an explicit
consensus In early 1919« By February It was generally
agreed that the federal executive branch was too large
and too expensive. Zhere sight be excellent reasons why
this situation had come about* but the lower house had no
intention of continuing the "war emergency*1 agencies.
This is not to say that there were no small groups, even
entire committees, which were promoting continuation and
creation of executive agencies. The advocates of women's
bureaus, labor conciliation boards, and veterans' relief
even enjoyed some success.* But the implicit agreement
in the House of Representatives was in favor of reduced
federal expenditures and discontinuation of most federally
administered programs.
The Bouse Initiated the celebrated -reaction" of
the 1920 # s for special constitutional reasons. It is
traditionally the revenue-raising arm of any democratic
government. It is also the branch closest to the elector-
ate» The confluence of these two principles endowed the
corporate body of *05 representatives with a specific
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perspective that wan generally antithetical to the execu-
tive branch and even the Senate. Only a third of the
senate had faced the electorate since 1916 and none of
the executive had done so*
Senators were generally conceded to represent
themselves only. he adoption of the primary and popu-
lar election had largely freed the Senator from the party
discipline which had maintained when state legislatures
sent then to Washington as extraordinary ambassadors*
Senator obert La ollette of Wisconsin won a position in
ths steering Committee of the tfpper chamber while sharing
no general party position with his colleagues. 2
Republicans in the country were looking toward
1920 with a mixture of confidence and apprehension. he
1918 congressional elections had confirmed the grassroots
support. However*, the experience of the 1912 Bull ^oose
candidacy of Theodore Roosevelt was too fresh in memory
to sake them complacent* Party leaders in the Bouse were
well aware of the need for a unified party* This realiza-
tion had to take into account the remaining strength of
the old 1 rogressives, many of whom were in the ?enate
itself. 3 The practical problem of regular republicans was
to gain ideological and mechanical control of the party.
Falling that* the problem was to reduce intra-party
conflict and avoid a 1912-style split. The mutual objec-
tive of both standpatters and progressives was turning
«• ar'.t o"
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out the Democrats in 1920. "he standpatters held tha
grassroots and ths Progressives held the public leader-
ship. Among the old regulars, Cannon was too ancient.
Lodge uninterested in the Presidency, and Taft suspect
for his service on the «ar Labor Board. he Progressives
had all the leading llghtsi I^eonard Wood, lihu uoot,
and iobert LaPollette.^
Accordingly, the policies initiated by the
Republican-controlled House are central to any discussion
of subsequent national policy through the 1920* s. The
negotiations of the Treaty of Versailles and events in
Ittrope directed the nation's attention toward the President
and the Senate, but republican organization and policies
were being forged in the House of Representatives which
would have a profound effect upon the future direction of
the United -tates.
The 65th Congress was due to end on March **, 191 9
•
Until the last hours, no one could be sure whether or not
a special session would be called.** When Senators France,
LaFollette, and Sherman filibustered several major appro-
priation bills into oblivion in the early aorning hours of
Sarch 5# 1919» the administration was forced to call for a
special session. ? The epubli can-controlled 66th Congress
thus came to Washington months early, in the interim,
there was a furious struggle for dominance of the
•Mi
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ine first battle was fought over the next speaker
of the House. The issue shaped up between Chicago's
James 1« Mann and Boston's Frederick H. Gillett, who won
the post in conference action on February 27» 1919. ftann,
however, seized control of the Committee on Committees*
He had been minority leader and aspired to the Speakership*
He was generally favored by the western representatives
and regulars, but had been associated with anti-war and
pro-German statements before the war.*"
In conference *ienn proposed that the Committee on
Committees1* be composed of one representative from each
state, voting the numerical strength of Republican repre-
sentation in each state* In the 65th Congress, Hann had
chaired a Republican advisory committee of five to the
newly created Committee on Committees. his became the
Steering Committee of the House*
The real power in the epublican House was largely
lodged in the Committee on Committees, and theoreti-
cally the thirty-nine members of the committee,
representing the Republican states, and each castlrc
a vote equal to the Republican strength in the House
of his state decided who should be the members of
the fifty or sixty committees of the House, and con-
stituted them as they saw fit* Actually, from the
inauguration of the new system, the control of the
Committee on Committees virtually passed to Mr* Hann,
the Member exercising by far the greatest single
personal influence in the House, and thus Mr* Kann,
the Illinois veteran and former floor assistant of
Cannon* became in consequence of many subtle factors
the true power behind the scenes in the House, and
this not only unknown to the country, but as a
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In dominating the coraralttee which assigned the com-
mittee pieces to the Republican Membership of the
House Mr. Nann controlled the right of reward and
punishment, and In any organization, In any form of
society, that Is an attribute of power. 12
It Is the connection with "Czar" Cannon that
bring* the perspective to the gag law. ->e venerable
congressman from Illinois Is something of a grey eminence
behind all the vergeance-taking of the Republicans In the
house. Kann had been Cannon's defender and aide In the
1910 insurgency. -* Cannon had suffered aoost froia the
Progressive movement In the party. It was " v:annonls»*
that had been the target of the muckrakers, reformers,
and social responsibility promoters prior to 1910. -r-
ther. It was the 1910 Insurgency which had ended legisla-
tive dominance of the federal o-overnment. be very
word "frag" Is etymologlcally associated with the procedures
of democratic, legislative bodies.
*
The 1910 Insurgency
Great pressures of social change were under way
durin* the two administrations of Theodore Roosevelt. The
Hough aider's decision not to run In 190$ set off a
struggle within the party which led to the abortive
Progressive Party movement In 1912. the roots of the In-
ternal struga-le were economic 1 the tariff Issue and
antl-lnjunctlon legislation.
Cannon went to the GOP convention of 1908 as a




Hoosevelt's years tends to obscure the real power of the
Congress. Ae the undisputed master of the House, Cannon
was a preeminent party leader. ' hen the convention
opened, there were strong pressures from progressives for
the partj to abandon its traditional position of the high
protective tariff • Implicit in this argument was a
reshaping of the revenue-raising apparatus of the govern-
ment.18
Cannon also went to the convention to defend his
stewardship of Congress. He had the responsibility of
stopping most of the progressive legislation of the
oosevelt Administration* hose proposals were later en-
acted by aft and ailson, but only after the Speaker had
19been stripped of his power by the 1910 insurgency. w mt
at the convention of 1908, Cannon held the Congress, the
Republican Party, and the country to a platform which rejec-
20ted the growing claims of organized labor. La stub-
bornness cost him the Presidential nomination in 1908, the
traditional powers of the Speakership in 1910, and his
congressional seat and seniority ir* 1912. 2* hether he
was right or wrong, he was certainly consistent.
When progressive Republican representatives crossed
the aisle to vote with the Democratic minority on *arch 19t
1910, the specific effect was to remove the peaker from
the Committee on Rules, make that committee one of ten
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members vice their appointment by the Speaker. »hat resul-
ted was a lessenlng of party regularity. 22 From the
centralised, absolute power of the speaker there devolved
the baronial flefdoms of the committee chairmen. he
major committees had gotten control of their own appro-
priations in I885 during a previous insurgency. The result
of that change in the organization of the House wasi
. • the beginning of executive Interference in legis-
lation which has led to executive dominance in
legislation for appropriations to meet the demands of
the spenders instead of the demands of the taxpayers. 2 3
he standpatters* position as regards party irregu-
larity was that insurgency resulted in dissipation of
authority, which led to the diffusion of responsibility,
which in turn made the Congress vulnerable to the promo-
tions of special interests. 2^ hose interests were not
evil in themselves, whether bankers* or labor leaders*.
But if party discipline could not be enforced in the House
of :Representatives, the members would Inevitably become
the creatures of outside agencies rather than their
constituents.
*
The hlrd 1 eflclency Appropriations Act
Fiscal chaos reigned in the government as the
3d session, 65th Congress drew to a close. :o the dis-
organization of the House was added the far-flung require-
ments of a government in the throes of Its first world war.
rhere were few social problems which did not have their
: •twines
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own executive agency created by executive order and
initially funded by executive emergency appropriation.
The republican minority in early 1919 saw their task as
pruning the executive branch fiscally and politically in
preparation for the 1920 elections. A second task, not
unrelated to the first* was to force President Wilson to
call a special session as soon as possible* his would
bring the Republican 66th Congress into being early. To
finance his administration. Wilson was forced to convene
the hostile Congress. To compound the irony, he had pub-
licly asked the country to give him a Democratic majority
on election eve. 2^
Host of the emergency agencies* appropriations
were in the deficiency appropriation sponsored by the
Appropriations Committee. ' Kentucky democrat 3wagar
Snerley was lame duck chairman, defeated by labor defec-
tions in Louisville despite a special plea from the
President. 2 ' The bill was Introduced February 28, 1919#
and the senior minority member, James !• Good of Iowa,
proposed the following amendment
i
That no part of the money appropriated by this act
shall be used for any personal services or to pay for
any advertisement, telegram, letter, or circular
designed to defeat or enact any proposed legislation
of Congress, or to influence any Member of Congress
to vote on any appropriation unless specifically
authorised • 29
Discussion quickly got around to the lobby inc
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Congressman Thomas L. blantor (Democrat- Texas) led the
attacks on the BSB8« the Department of Labor, and Samuel
Gompers. :ose lobbying efforts were generally recognized
as not being a legitimate exercise of the executive branch.
Representative Good admitted, "... it ought not to be
necessary to pass amendments of this kind. "30 |g also
hinted that if the amendment were adopted, it should be
made general and should apply to all appropriations rather
than being limited only to the Third Deficiency Appropriation
Act. 31
Congressman Stafford (nepublican-Wisconsin) took
him up and moved that the words "or any other" be inserted.
This meant that, if accepted, the amendment would apply to
the use of all appropriations. Stafford admitted the
amendment was subject to a point of order. He referred to
the Senate-originated provision in the Sundry Civil Bill
(March 1, 1919) canceling all governmental publications
which did not have congressional approval. "Thftre are
connected with the Government ^7 publicity bureaus, and
every one, on occasion, resorts to the practice that is
sought to be discontinued by the pending amendment. *32
James Gallivan (Democrat-Massachusetts), one of
four representatives who voted to continue funding the
, 33 attempted a diversion by linking the amendment to
the franking privilege. his brought on another anti-labor
tirade from Blanton and defense from strong labor state
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representatives such as Cooper of Chto. ** The floor mana-
ger, Swagar Sherley, terminated debate by acquiescing to
the sense of the House t
... 1 do not believe In riders upon an appropriation
bill. I think they are a mistake, but the Tiouse seema
to want to legislate on this matter. If they do, 1 am
willing for the House to express Its opinion and I
will not make the point of order. ... 35
The amendment passed and the bill went to the Senate where
It died along with other raejor appropriations in a
Republican filibuster. It was largely unnoticed by the
press* The Associated Press carried the story that
" ... an amendment proposed by itep. Good of Iowa forbids
the use of money provided by the bill by government agen-
cies in propaganda designed to perpetuate themselves."^
he more specialized trade and business magazines
were gearing up for an assault against the Wilson
Administration's labor policies. ;he Karch Governors and
Mayors Conference, the coming hearings on the National
Employment Service, and the arguments for continued govern-
ment operation of communications utilities stimulated a
vigorous reaction. Industry magazine, established in
Cecember 1919 and edited by Henry Harrison Lewis, led the
battle against bureaucrats In general and the in par-
ticular. Every biweekly Issue from January to August 1919
carried two or more afetlcles attacking the administration's
labor policy. h« ,; :arch 1 Issue stated
i
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Son* action should be taken by Congress to prevent
placeholders using public funds for perpetuation of
their jobs* he news are filled with statements •
omeone paid for the thousands of telegrams which
deluged Congress. he lost Office Department paid
for carrying franked letters for the sane purpose.
Hie taxpayer in the ultimate analysis pays ... 3?
Although other trade and business periodicals
echoed the same themes. Industry was the most strident.
• orld's Work , edited by Arthur Page in March 1919t described
the Lewis magazine as " ... a paper published at
Washington in the interest of the employers.
^
A conservative, traditional economic program was
a major theme of the Hepubllcan Party through the 1920
elections. his theme was their interpretation of the
voters' message in the 1918 congressional elections. The
tendency toward a larger bureaucracy and the promotion of
the bureaucracy's progress were inextricably linked to the
federal budget issue. Hie House was the only appropriate
agency to reduce expenditures since the Senate was so
spendthrift that it rarely reduced appropriations.-^ The
war had greatly aggravated this trend.
As of October 1919* *>oe annon claimed that the
last Democratic Congress had expended forty-five billion
dollars,
• • • more than the entire disbursements of the federal
jvernment from the first inauguration of George
Washington to the second inauguration of «oodrow
Wilson • • • greater than the entire wealth of the
American people In the census year 18$0 . . • double
the gold production of the world in the ^00 years










and one-half tines the total resources of all the
national banks. • • • The executive departments con*
tlnue to estimate peace expenditures on a war basis
Just as though gold grew like mushrooms In the
rreasury cellar and bank notes budded like leaves on
the trees In springtime. °
The problem was traceable to the IB85 reform which
distributed the appropriation process to the six major
committees.^1 It was compounded by the 1910 Insurgency
which removed the Speaker as the single accountable Indi-
vidual, ibis diffusion of authority made the House
vulnerable to special pleadings. In Cannon's view, govera-
raent had become a special Interest. c It secured some
form of either executive or legislative legitimacy, pro-
moted a demand for Its services, secured a small appropria-
tion for apparently innocuous activities, and then pointed
trliHsphantly to the whole process as evidence that social
Justice demanded continuance and more money.^
The appropriations process was restored to the
Appropriations Committee In 1921 and the Vhird Deficiency
£111 (1919) carried a small amount of money for a "Bureau
of Efficiency." By 1921 the entire revenue system of the
United States was revised and had become essentially what
it Is today. while the budget preparation process has
moved toward the President in direct proportion to the
executive's initiation of legislation, the Congress has









If we leave any part of it /the budget *° *h« Executive
we shall only exaggerate the present embarrassments.
fhe electorate will oortlnue to hold the representa-
tives responsible for the budget, whatever power they
surrender to the Executive.^
the hepubliean Party continued to hammer this
thetae and the 1920 platform, controlled by standpatter
Hepresentatlve James £• Watson of Indiana, reflected
antagonism to self-promoting, partisan bureaucracy.
The administration has not demobilized the army of
placeholders* It continued a method of financing
which was indefensible. • • • It has used arbitrary
and inquisitorial control over the life of the people
£t©7 carry confusion into Industrial life.^• • •
.he platform was conservative by any standards.
The progressive Wisconsin delegation's substitute did not
even receive a second and the chairman had to call for
order several times furlng the reading farty regularity
and atandpattlng had been vindicated at the expense of the
reformers. Cannon received a standing ovation as he ironi-
cally held a glass of water over his head and vowed to
abide by the Prohibition Amendment.^ He was eighty-four
then and this was to be his last hepubllcan convention.
His first had seen the nomination of Abraham Lincoln. **?
Ihe 66th Congress* 1st Session
The heated issue of the Treaty of ersailles is
sometimes cited as reason for convening the 66th Congress
early la the special session of ftay 19. 1919.^ -he fis-
cal crisis occasioned by the failure of so many bills In







the peace end League Issue was foremost In the nation's
press* e *ashlngton Tost carried an editorial daily on
one aspect or another of the controversial treaty. Kor
years afterward, the bibliography of the American
Historical Association would reflect the constitutional
Issue with articles on presidential and enate responsi-
bilities.^9
One well known advocate* Colonel George Harvey,
founded a new magazine to Join the debate. Modestly titled
The ,eeklv .* the first issue of March l t 1919 carried an
article entitled "No Gag Law.* The reference, however,
was to a larger issue than that in the House. Harvey
castigated the President for his penchant for publicity
and the effrontery of telling the Senate that they could
not debate the still secret terms of the first draft
$
• • •. 1st was preparing to address the people directly,
In the wildest possible manner i as if to appeal to them
against their own representatives and lawmakers. "5* ihat
is, of course, exactly what the President eventually
attempted in his ill-fated western trip.
Ihe die was cast in Congress, however, and the
administration's aajor policies were doomed to frustration.
The magazine world's Work published an obituary of the
Democratic 65th Congress that was generally favorable,
crediting them with useful legislation in labor law, income
taxes, the direct election of Senators and the Federal
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-teserve Law* rhe same issue heralded the return of
"resurgent Cannonism." The Speaker was no longer commander
of the House, Ironically due to Democratic reforms in the
rules. -he power now lay in the Committee on Committees,
seized by Cannon and Kann. The lovers of political para-
dox could find no situation more productive of unholy
Joy." 52
Republican progressives In the House Mere fooled,
but they fought back under the leadership of oosevelt's
son-in-law, Mcholas Longworth of Ohio. The control of
the Committee on Committees by frann was publicly described
as a triumph of reactionist. Longworth said the committee
"represented only large cities and manufacturing centers,
was made up of millionaires and did not represent agrl-
culture, labor or a fair geographical distribution."
was the attitude which had made the tepublicans e minority
in the recent past, charged Longworth. *^ This pressure of
the Ohio representative and about sixty other progressives
had the effect of keeping the policy apparatus In the
House loosely divided among the steering Committee, the
other major committees (such as *ays and Reans and
Appropriations) and the Committee on Committees.* Lhls
diffusion of authority had the effect of keeping secret
the policy-making machinery. ** Longworth had succeeded
temporarily in his 1910 Insurgency and his faction had to
be dealt with In 1919* In fact, much later, he became
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•peaker himself.*6 Kawever, the test was In ths 1920
Republican convsntlon and he was neither a delegate nor
a member of any important committees.*' e platform and
the candidate were not likely to wara a progressive's
heart
•
he Deficiency Appropriation I-ill—Again
The bill case up again Kay 29t 1919* Congressman
Good was the chairman of the Appropriations Committee la
the new Congress and he set the theme of Republican fiscal
policy in his management of the bill. He claimed huge
savings in actual dollars as well as tightening of pro-
cedures* he major claims were in the «ar Department,
Mavy Department , and the Alaskan railroad. He also cut
the to 1272,000 from >1, 800, 000. That money would
pay the debts of the USES and carry it to July 1, 1919*
He reported the previous session's gag amendment and
frankly admitted that it was subject to a point of order.
"It Is new legislation, but it will prohibit a practice
that has been indulged in so often, without regard to
what administration is in power. m ^
The question of riders on amendments on the appro-
priation bills was constantly recurring. In some cases,
It was an Issue of committee prerogative. Members objected
to their legislative deliberations in committee being
modified by action on the floor.^ rhere could be no
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legislation. Also* there was an implicit relationship
with tha executive agencies which the various representa-
tive* were bound to defend. It was bad business procedure
as well as bad politics.
Conversely, the political situation was tempting.
Time was short for the executive and the government could
very well be bankrupt on June 30 if appropriation bills
were not signed. Substantive issues referred to committee
could be effectively delayed by Democratic minorities.
Appropriation bills always had priority on the floor of
the Hogse and could be called up on short notice before
an empty chamber. fhe majority had many advantages on
any issue which could coamand either party loyalty or
commend itself in principle, nepublicans controlled the
chair, who would rule on any point of order raised by the
opposition. If the chalr # s ruling was challenged, the
House would resolve it by simple majority vote. Democratic
opposition on the floor to publicly supported issues would
result in good publicity for the republican cause. Given
a consensus against the use of appropriations for publicity
purposes* the natural jealousy of the House concerning
revenue measures, the national antipathy to George creel
and his fellow publicists, and the need for speed in the
appropriations process, it la not surprising that the
measure never went to the Judiciary Committee. °
Congressman ^lanton coutlnued his battle against
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the USRS. He attempted the strategy of striking the
reduced appropriation* This failed and ha raised tha
point of order. ©preventative Good tried rather patiently
to assure him that the reduced appropriation was in the
interest of good business only* /he appropriation did not
contemplate legitimizing the (. >^ in any way. ihe chair
(J. Hampton Moore, nepubl lean-Pennsylvania) turned Good's
argument upon hia and ruled in the most narrow sense that
no law provided for the i therefore the point of order
was sustained. The money was later restored in the
enate-house conference, but it required no genius of
insight to foresee that there would be no legislatively
approved federal role In employment from the 66th congress*
One issue remained in the floor debate. It had
been raised by epresentetlve Smith earlier and now he
offered an amendment to the paragraph, inserting the
words "in the discharge of their official duties** after
the words -United states."- 2 Good, the sponsor of the bill
and the original amendment, made no objection, 'ood saw
no real difference in the language. Smith then saidt
I think the amendment I offer is necessary la order to
explain the provision* Otherwise the employees might
be held to be violating the penal section if they
should communicate with their .Members of congress
except through official chanrels.^3
Ke further Insisted that the amendment be adopted or the
word "employees" dropped*
Finis J« Garrett (Democrat- Tennessee) defended the
-
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original language* He pointed out that the :-alth language
would restrict the official la the actual performance of
hie duty since communicating was a major function and
Indeed a responsibility of any official. He concluded his
argument by citing a hearsay case in which a federal Judge
had issued an injunction against a government official,
enjoining him not to communicate any information to
Congress. -**
Smith was not satisfied and he continued to insist
upon the federal employee's right to communicate with his
congressman
t
Do you want to apply military rules to civil employees
of the Government and provide that they shall have to
communicate with Congressmen through their superior
officers • • • -roployeee have no official function to
perform in communicating with Congress. I think to
prohibit communications from employees except through
official channels is un-American .6:5
Another representative tried a new tack with ^mith.
He took the simple view that the provision merely meant
the use of public funds. *I take it that It simply pro-
hibits employees or officials of the Government from using
public funds in communicating to Congress." All communi-
cations from public employees involving public funds should
be through official channels."^
Smith was having his own communication problems so
he tried again. He drew the distinction between the offi-
cer and the employee. The officer should be held to a






official duties. Art employee could not be so held. Any
officer* s communications should be through channels and
official. But the effect on employees would be to dissuade
them from "expressing their opinions about the conduct of
public business.""? He insisted he favored the provision
and sought the clarifying language to "protect employees
of the Government in their right to express their opinions
concerning legislation and the conduct of the public busi-
ness without securing the consent of some bureau officer
to do so."°° The record does not indicate how well the
Berbers followed the sophisticated arra^-eni, but fcitfc*!
amendment was rejected and what has become known as the
gag law passed onto the statute book.
rhe bill moved on to the Senate and conference
actior. The enate added the language "on the request of
Members of Congress" and "proper" to the words "official
channels." The Congress, having accepted the proposition
that the lobbying of executive officers had to be pro-
scribed explicitly, was faced with reducing the law to
specific language*
A Type of , reedom Entirely Kew
his discussion has dealt heavily with the
procedural issues. Because those issues are the only ones
upon which the individuals in Congress could probably
agree, they are important. .he *ll*on Administration had
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a realignment of executive-legislative relations.
Beginning with -llson's "acid test" call for a sympathetic
Congress on the eve of the 191 R elections*^ to his specific
exclusion of the Senate from the treaty negotiations at
Versailles, the executive aggrandizement of power was a
threat tongress could not Ignore. The charges of autocrat
were not entirely hyperbole.?
George ^reel's activities In domestic labor
relations portended a kind of special Interest representa-
tion In the executive which could bring Irresistible pres-
sure on any recalcitrant congressman. Coupled with the
hortatory pens of the CPI f s writers, there was a potential
for an unprecedented combination of information, adminis-
tration and, eventually, legislation.
John B. Densmore's activities in an Francisco
demonstrated the administration's attitudes toward local
and state legal procedure, were the Department of Labor
to complete the link by the establishment of a national
employment service, the grip of the executive on the nation's
economy would be complete.
oger Babson's program of centralized record-keeping
on the individual worker was a high-water mark of the mana-
gerial revolutions presumptions. Some would call It
Ialorlsm, others Socialism, and still others Frussiani-
zation. whatever It was called, It must have seemed either
eccentric or mad to congressmen with bucolic, Jeffersonlan
«*:«•
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ideals* Veterans of the Alnsworth-*ood muster roll con-
troversy knew the Importance of the control of records
and Information centers.'
The saae sort of perspective has to be applied to
the «ar Department's General Staff. The Congress was not
prepared to continue a large standing army, a centralized
general staff, or universal military training. The condi-
tions which had created these institutions no longer
existed, what is more, the assumptions which had led to
their initial creation had been substantially discredited.
The attacks upon military discipline were a warning to any
militarist with political ambitions, including John J.
Pershing and Leonard Wood (who was not so much a militarist
as a progressive opportunist). That this policy worked so
well is Illustrated by the following passage in frank I
.
M'illls' s nominating speech for *arren G. Harding at the
1920 hepublican convention
1
. . . as a member of the Senate it was his honor and
privilege to introduce into the Senate of the United
States and to secure the passage of the legislation
that provided for the Roosevelt Division for service
in France /applause/ legislation that was greatly
welcomed by patriotic people, but it was not availed
of because of an executive partisan bigotry abso-
lutely without parallel in all the annals of war.
/Applause, loud and prolongedJ**
lit statement drew the loudest and longest
applause of the speech. tt Roosevelt Division represented
voluntarism, amateurism, and the romantic tradition that
had been rejected by the ^elective Service Act, the
ft*







"Leavenworth clique** and the Espionage and Sedition lawn.
The image of Theodore oosevelt leading an infantry
assault in Argonne or St. Hihiel may be ludicrous at this
remove but it was not in 1920.
Xhe substantive issues were crucial and they loomed
large. here was a minor depression, as expected, in 1919#
and a larger one in 1920-1921.73 One writer has called
1919 the "Year of the Strike." 7^ The Gimbel's bombings
occurred in June, and the first "ned raids" and deporta-
tions occurred shortly thereafter, rhese social disloca-
tions, injustices, and depressions were nothing new to a
generation which had been conceived in the Civil *ar and
come to maturity in its aftermath. 7^
The insistence of the Congress upon restoring the
procedural process was not mere complacency. It was based
upon an old and revered concept of representation!
His concern ^the representative*^ is to prevent action
based on factious interest. . . . Kadi son envisages
representation as a way of bringing dangerous social
conflict Into a single central forum, where it can be
controlled by balancing and stalemating. . . . Only
if each representative pursues the factious interests
of his constituency can the various factious interests
in the nation balance each other off in the government. 7"
The Wilson Administration had become too big and
too powerful. The lofty rhetoric which was imitated
through the multiple layers of the bureaucracy was merely
ideological camouflage for a will to power. 77 ihe govern-
ment functionaries had become their own special interests.
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representing themselves and new groups. One of their
victims, Korrls Killqult, from an entirely different
point of the political spectrum occupied by Harding and
Cannon, described the situation In a mock interview on
October 3# 1920
i
And have they ^£the Wilson Administration^ Introduced
the promised new freedom into America?
Chief Editor of a Conservative Dailyt Indeed,
they have inaugurated a type of freedom entirely new
In America, not the old-fashioned vulgar freedom of
the rabble, but the freedom of administration offi-
cials from all constitutional restraints and from
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THE LAW IS RETAINED
Overview
The lew passed in 1919 Involved elements of partisan
politics* federal fiscal policy, and institutional integ-
rity. Conservative Republicans were taking the first
tentative steps toward a long period of ascendancy. An
integral part of that ascendancy was a return—however
incomplete—to a smaller executive role in the economy and
the society. Most importantly* the House of Representatives
was reasserting its role in the determination of national
policy.
The specific law signed July 11, 1919 has changed
In the intervening year si but* of course* so has the soci-
ety. The fiscal comparison is almost meaningless in a
context whereby the annual deficit is equal to the total
expenditure for the "Great War." The legislative-executive
relationship has undergone the most radical change. The
New Deal fractured forever the -Republican archetypes of
Joseph Cannon and James ft. Kann. However* partisan poli-
tics remain and few issues are so hotly debated as that of
government propaganda.
Predictably* the attempts at implementation of the
law have occurred in those circumstances of hostile
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legislators bridling at executive promotions of programs*
ihs law became an issue of controversy in 1933
during the debate over the Jopeland Food and Drug Bill.
In this case the Food and Drug Administration dampened
its campaign for the Copeland Bill and took greater
caution about its publicity in general * in spite of the
fact that it mas authorised in its own appropriation
act to illustrate the results of its work. Other
agencies as wall have followed a policy of caution when
this law might be Invoked* though in no case has the
"gag" law ever been enforced in the extreme interpre-
tation which might be given to it. Obviously* an
extreme interpretation would forbid the distribution
to congressmen of much of the literature published by
administrative agencies. 1
The issue arose during hearings by the House
Publicity and Propaganda Subcommittee in its investigation
of the activities of the Federal ecurlty Agency* *ar
Department, In 19^7-19^. This Investigation of publicity
activities in support of universal military training
charged the war Department with engaging in "activities
calculated to build up a federally stimulated public demand
upon Congress for enactment of legislation for universal
military training." Committee questioning referenced
possible violations of Title 18* U.3.C. by members of the
War Bepartnent. 2
The 1919 themes are evident in the Congress's
actions through today* Although "legitimate" informstion
activity is accepted* aggressive programs In support of
proposed legislation such as the Copeland Bill fall within
the proscribed area. The tendency of Congress is to be
extremely specific in the allocation of appropriations.
For example* i-ubllc Law 89-555 of September 6, 1966
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(Independent Offices Appropriations Act, 1967) specifically
restricted personnel and administrative staffs to a ratio
of li35t United all research projects to the exact funding
of the project itself, and prohibited holding funds over
to the succeeding fiscal year. These qualifications fol-
lowed the section which generally forbade publicity or
propaganda, rhe Congress expressed disfavor with expanding
the public relations functions of ths Independent offices,
•hey followed that with limitations upon the personnel
staffs. Halted the fact-finding function, and provided
advance notice that the funds would be retracted even-
tually. 5
It is beyond the present scope to examine the
historical circumstances of each legislative-executive
conflict. It is not inappropriate to return to a pro-
cedural issue, specifically the revision of 41 U.S.
Stat. 68 (1919).
That revision illustrates several principles of the
legislative-executive relation. Firstly, the law has been
retained despite its lack of use. Secondly, revision of
the law by the legislative branch has added the wort
"lobbying," a word and description which was carefully
avoided in 1919. Thirdly, the law has been popularly
designated the gag law, a word not only avoided in 1919*
but specifically denounced as being un-American.
The law remains an explicit restriction of
late tern Itaooei*; 6»3oi














executive relations with constituents. It includes a
threat, fine and removal for violation of that relation.
In practice it is less a threat to the politician than the
bureaucrat. That is* any prosecution would occur through
the offices of the Attorney General, a political appointee
naturally less inclined to pursue malefactors of sis own
administration than those of the previous one.
then passed, the law put the George 1 reels and the
John Densmores on notice that while they sight well secure
civil service appointments, they were subject to speedy
removal by the designated superior officer. Pursued far
enough through the bureaucracy, a politically appointed
officer would ultimately be reached. This accounts for
Densmore's low spirits when he wrote to Creel March 21,
1919» after Congress had adjourned without funding the
United Gtatee Employment Service (IB9)« -I shall
endeavor to raise funds, privately, to carry on a public
Information bureau in Washington, which will without
charge give disinterested information on Government
activities. "**
evlsion
There is a significant difference in the current
condition of the three restrictive laws of 1913-1919. The
1913 rider concerning the hiring of publicity experts
became 5 U.s.C. 3107 (19?0). atle 5 is concerned with
general provisions for the organization and administration
rq# lac
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of the executive agencies and departments. The amendment
to the -Sundry- Bill of Karch 1, 1919 was translated Into
44 U.S.C. 501 (1970) concerning regulations for the opera-
tion of the Government Printing Office. These are
fundamentally administrative limitations and guidance for
the efficient conduct of the government's business.*
The gag law, 41 U.S. Stat. 68, was translated into
the criminal statutes, violation of 18 U.. . c. 1913 carries
a penalty of $500 fine, one year imprisonment and removal—
a misdemeanor offense, but an offense nonetheless.
In 1926, the Congress initiated a general review
and revision of the statutes at large and the revised
statutes at large. The intent was to codify, revise, and
discard the great body of laws accumulated during the
history of the Hepubllc. The work has continued to this
date, with new editions of the U.S. Code being published
every six years or so since 1926.
The gag law remained 41 U.S. Stat. 68 until the
first revision of the criminal statutes in the 1940 edi-
tion of the U. c . Code. In that edition, the gag law
became IB U.S.C. 201. There was little revision of the
actual law at that time.?
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1943
abolished the House Committee on Revision of the Laws and
assigned responsibility for subsequent review of the
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Subcommittee Number One of that committee Introduced a
bill, H.Fi* 2200, Into the 79th Congress which would revise
the 19^0 Title 18. Congress adjourned before the bill
could be enacted or heard*
Finally, on Karen 7, 19^7, the newly convened
80th Congress, Subcommittee for Revision of Titles 18
(Crimes and Criminal Procedure) and 28, (Judicial
Organization) opened hearings on . . 1600, "a bill to
revise, codify and enact Into positive law 11 tie 18." It
was substantially the same bill Introduced into the 79th
Congress, 472 pages long, and the first witness was the
former chairman of the subcommittee, Eugene J. Keogh,
Representative of the 9th Congressional District, Wm
York* However, the actual revision of Title 18 was not
done by the subcommittee*
The House commissioned the west Publishing Company,
St* Paul, Minnesota, to write Titles 18 and 28. The pub-
lishing company hired *'. w* Barron, formerly Chief,
Appellate Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice,
to oversee the project.^ As the company completed drafts
of recommended revisions, they were forwarded to eminent
lawyers and Judges for comment. The entire legal world
was Interested in this work since there had been no sub*
stantlal review of the criminal statutes since 1909* The
revision received a thorough review before It became
. . 1600. ihe Supreme Court was interested enough to
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appoint a committee consisting of Justices itone, Douglas,
and Frankfurter to review the crucial Titles 18 and 28,1°
he intent of Congress was to remove the statutes
from the status of "prima facie" and to enact Into "positive
law". In the words of Mr. Keogh, it would "provide a
permanent framework around which all future new or amenda-
tory legislation can be enacted. "** Those testifying before
the committee pleaded that the bill not become an issue of
polities* They feared the huge bill (472 pages) would be
so marked up as to defeat the intent and nullify the work
devoted to It. *« Keogh said, "*e have sought to avoid
as far as possible any substantive changes that did not
meet with unanimity of opinion. "* 2
The legislation, ••« 1600, was enacted June 25,
1948| Chapter 645, 62 Stat. 792. 13 Section 1913 Is the
provision for the gag law and It Is titled "Lobbying with
Appropriated Honeys." The reviser's notes indicate that
the words "department" and "agency" were added in three
instances after "United I tates." his was done to elimi-
nate doubt as to the scope of the section. Words "on
conviction thereof" were eliminated as being surplus and
reference to the offense as a misdemeanor was eliminated
as being redundant.
There have been no convictions under the law, as
41 U. ... tat. 68 (1919K 11 U.3.C. 201 (1940), or 18 U.5.C.
1913 (1948). The law is cited in a footnote to Argilly v.
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U.S. ine note uses the section to uphold "The feet
that cause for dismissal embraces conduct which is also
criminal does not render a proceeding a criainal action.
"
The case Involved a suit by an employee of the Bureau of
Naturalization alleging violation of due process in his
dismissal for politically related activities.
Despite the fact that there have been no convic-
tions under the law, it would seem premature to declare it
a dead issue. The Congress and the Judiciary—to include
three members of the Supreme Court—have given the matter
cursory attention at least. *5
Lobby 1 nsr
It was in 19^0 that the title "Lobbying with
Appropriated Honeys"^ was added to the law. Like the gag
term, "lobbying" was not explicitly used in the original
construction of the amendment. ibis very likely was due
to a 1913 exercise in legislative futility—the Overman
investigation. ?
Shortly after his 1913 inauguration (April),
President Wilson called a special session of Congress to
fulfil Democratic ple&gea for tariff revision downward.
The session convened and very few days afterward,
Representative Oscar Mm Underwood (Democrat-Alabama) intro-
duced a bill calling for reduction on 958 itews. :he bill
went through the House In short order 1 but it ran into
difficulty in the less disciplined Senate. 18
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President . llaon retaliated by denouncing special
Interest lobbyists In a press release of Kay 27» 1913*
here is every evidence that money without Halt is being
spent to sustain this lobby* and to create an appearance
of a pressure of public opinion antagonistic to some of
the chief items of the tariff bill."19
The Senate acted quickly. Senator Albert 5.
Cummins (republican-Iowa) introduced a resolution20 which
was referred to a subcommittee chaired by Senator Lee
Overman (Democrat*North Carolina)* The major questions to
be resolved were the tariff-special interest issues devel-
oped during the preceding years* At last it seemed the
campaigns of the muchrakers had broken the Congress's wall
of rule-enforced silence.
BMI general charges are familiar. The standpatters
had prevented legislation which would have lowered prices
and generally improved the conditions of the lower classes.
he special interests had repaid the obstructionists with
political favors and, some suspected, actual bribes.
One month later, the New York World and the Chicago
Tribune21 added fuel to the fire by beginning publication
of the Intimate revelations of a discharged rational
Association of Manufacturers lobbyist, Martin ?*• Mulhall. 22
The documents implicated former President * 1111am H. Taft,
his Vice President, James 3. German, five senators, and
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National Association of K.anufacturers. .^ulhall had
lobbied for manufacturers through their affillateai the
atioral council for Industrial Defense, the National
Tariff Commission Association* and th« -orkingoen's
Protective Association (an open shop organisation). *
he House proceeded upon Its own Investigation
with a select committee chaired by Finis -J* Garrett
(Democrat-Tennessee). The Bouse was principally con*
cerned with the chancres against its ©embers and ultimately
absolved all but one—Jaaea MeDermott, an organisation
Democrat froa Chicago, He allegedly received money froa
District of Coluabla liquor dealers and pawn brokers* and
sabotaged labor legislation ^ He resigned to avoid cen-
sure and was promptly reelected to the 6Mfll Congress froa
the saae district. 26
The Senate attempted to fraae legislation to regu-
late lobbying. The hearings continued well into 191**.
Two bills were introduced in the 64th Congress. he
first2? essayed to define lobbying and set standards for
punishment. It was referred to the Coaalttee on Elections
and Privileges where it died. i.he second 2^ was to fraae
language prohibiting lobbying and it too died in coaalttee.
Periodic efforts were made to revive the issue, 2^ but by
2d Session, 64th Congress, "lobbying" had disappeared froa
the Congressional record Index.
ihe length and sensational is* of the investigation
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militated against any effective legislation, th parties
became Involved and no real charges could be sustained
against men like Cannon. here were only fifteen letters™
to or from the former Speaker and none substantiated im-
propriety. Congressman James -.. Good, who proposed the
gag amendment, was actually identified as a friend of
labor by the B?AR.^ The lobbying of the AIL was exposed
as substantially as that of the NAM. 3* The effort to link
the "special interests" became increasingly silly as it
developed that the RAK had actually attempted to persuade
Cannon to moderate his protectionist stance in 1908.33
James Van Cleave, NAM President, had gone to the convention
with a proposal to create an independent tariff commission.
Cannon "... no more trusted business men to determine
what was good for themselves than he trusted his colleagues
in Congress to determine what was good for the people they
represented • "
^
It had been a bruising controversy, although nothing
really came of it except a few tarnished reputations. As
the Chicago tribune commenced, it was "a case of the moun-
tain laboring and bringing forth a little ridiculous
mouse." 35 r the tough old standpatters, the brouhaha
raised by the Progressives and Democrats alike was merely
an exercise in hypocrisy. "Special Interests" indeed,—
that is the only kind of Interest there Is, and it is the
duty of the representative to represent them. "The national
•flOtfr


















Interest Is the sum of the objective interests that compose
the nation, when these are correctly determined through
rational deliberation " -^ It is the representative^ duty
to avoid the transitory passions of the moment and dis-
cover the objective interest. If he fails to do so, he
is simply turned out at the next election—as Edmund Burke
was after the "Address to the electors of Bristol"^' and
Cannon was in 1912.
Institutional Cags
The Congress ne'ver referred to 41 ! . . tat. ^ Q
as a gas law. On two occasions of the general debate,
February 13 and February 28,1913, Representatives on the
floor referred to gag as prior restraint and un-American.
This problem bothered Representative -mith as he struggled
with the wording of the amendment.
Older, cynical men such as Mann and Cannon had no
problem with the substantive issue. *hat was being done
might Impinge upon the personal liberties of individual
officials, and it might even be completely unworkable.
But over the long sweep of history, especially the history
of institutions, a proscription of this kind was not
unprecedented.
he word gag is related to the procedures used in
the British House of Commons whereby debate is cut short
in spite of the wish of a minority to continue. As in the
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American House, the closure Is brought Into operation
by a motion **that the question be now put." he
"guillotine" Is a related word which describes the limi-
tation of time. The "kangaroo" is a further development
wherein the "Chairman of Committees is empowered to select
the amendments that shall be debated, the unselected ones
being voted on without debate."^ The minority, or
injured party, uses gag to describe the procedure.
here was even an American precedent for institu-
tional gagging. During the years 1836-1344, the House of
Hapresentatlvaa biennially reenacted a rule which pre-
vented the presentation of abolitionist petitions on the
floor.-'- It was the cork upon legislative resolution of
the slavery issue. John Quincey Adams fought the rule
tenaciously In the House. ^ Ihe persistence in defense
of the right of petition earned him the sobriquet "Old
Kan Eloquent." * The House established a special commit-
tee (Chairman, Henry L. Finckney, South Carolina) which
decreed that all petitions dealing with slavery should be
Up
"laid upon the table." John C. Calhoun led the pro-
ponents of the many gag rules and resolutions, holding to
the theory that the federal government was bound to resist
attempts to make it (the government) the Instrument of
attacks on sectional domestic differences. The resolution
was rescinded •December 3, 1844 on the motion of John
Qulney Adams, when northern Democratic support for the
•T*
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issue of gagging waned* J The attitudes of Adams would
be recognizable in 1919* He opposed the politlcaans*
traditional scramble for the spoils of office and main-
tained that ! • . the nation needed a permanent body
of trained and competent public servants, ennoying ten-
ure of office during good behavior. In short, he looked
upon the national government as an agency for economic,
intellectual and moral iraprovemnnt."
The ironies abound. It was the Democratic 65th
Congress which first adopted the cloture rule on March 8,
1917 permitting a simple majority to terminate debate.
The first successful invocation of cloture was in 1919#
during the Versailles Treaty debate. ^ The effect was to
exacerbate the divisions in the Senate, harden the posi-
tions of the opposing sides, and ensure the final failure
of Senate ratification. 1*6
frl U.S. Stat. 68 (1919) and 18 U.S.C. 1913 (1970) Compared
Other than the addition of the title, the law is
remarkably similar today to what was finally adopted in
1919* The first element is the use of mofley« appropriated
by Congress. The second is communications intended to
Influence a congressman's decision. Ll-iese two elements
are modified by the specifications tn*»t communications
are authorized when requested by Co/\gress or when they
are necessary for the efficient conduct of the public
business.
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vhe punishment remains—specifically removal,
fine, and misdemeanor imprisonment. The sequence of the
language has been reversed Kith no real effect other than
emphasis. he 1919 law first stipulated removal following
a hearing, then provided the misdemeanor penalties. fhe
current law positively states the penalty and then pre-
scribes the hearing and removal.
Both versions of the law have in common an improb-
able sequence of events* he first element is the clearest
of all, as it was in 1919. 'hat is the use of public
funds. With the continuing revision of the budgetary pro-
cess begun in 1921 and the creation of the General
Accounting Office, there is reason to expect a better
accounting of public money. George Creel could not fund
the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy without
congressional knowledge today.
The second element of the offense, concerning the
intent of communications, is the weakest part of the law.
Proof of "intent" must be very clear in a criminal pro-
ceeding. Here the law comes closest to the Issues of
free speech and the right to petition. Had the *ar
Department been able to establish the use of any govern-
ment material in the letters to Congressman >allivan, the
government would have had a very good case. Ihe Intent












The 19^ revision which added the words
"department" and "agency*" raises the principal problem
of the law's application. Congressman Addiso* >mlth
had foreseen that debate, he strenuously insisted that
the amendment was Inadequate. He drew a precise differ-
ence between the civil servant's function as an officer
and as an employee. I former person, position, or func-
tion was strictly official in nature. Under that construc-
tion, any communication to Congress was bound by the
competence of the official. But the latter, the employee
in his general role as a citizen, was not bound la any
communication to Congress. 3mith envisioned the future
problem.
Ihe revisers were faced with a spectacular increase
in the numbers of federal civil servants—not including
the military and postal service. Unable to define where
the duties as an official ended and those as a citizen
began, the revisers broadened the scope to recognize the
growth of the executive branch. The addition of the words
•department** and "agency" meant that very few people on
the federal payroll were not included. The construction
of the law still favors "official channels."
The Congress is always alert to possible viola-
tions of principle and statute, although the legislative
branch still has not satisfactorily illuminated the







committee report specifically censured the *ar Department.
The use of federal funds for the purpose of influ-
encing legislation before -ongress is unlawful
under section 201, Title 1? of the O.S. Code. e
have, therefore, brought these matters £~v. i lobbying7
to the attention of the Department of Justice. . • .
rhat committee of the Republican 80th Congress was hostile
to the Democratic president. As in 1919* a world war
had just ended and the United States was embroiled in
international controversies. he agitation for a system
of universal military training was inextricably linked
to the draft. The ©1 screen ts in the War Department were
far down the hierarchy, struggling with the information
aspects of a tentative administration programs. I nlike the
situation In 1919t the committee offered a definition in
the same report t
Informations ihe act or process of communicating
knowledge, to enlighten.
Propaganda i a plan for the propagation of a doctrine
or a system of principles.
• • • It is the authority and the supposed objectivity
of Government which leads people to accept, without
question, the words released by Government officials
and agencies. **?
.he Reaction Point
It is in the coincidence of abuses In one or all
of the three functional areas of administration, appro-
priations, and information that congressional reaction is
elicited. fhe political appointee of the administration
Is free to exchange almost any kind of information In
almost any forum. When he uses congresslonally appropriated
*a*i ^o e
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funds specified for another purpose, it is a violation.
Creel* s words were no real threat! but his place in the
administration and his use of his committee's funds were.
Densmore occupied a position considerably below that of
cabinet members and heads of special agencies. But his
place at the central point of a government-funded,
labor-organized, national employment service was a threat
indeed. Bis administration of the proposed system could
create the information necessary to control the appropria-
tions. If General Harch and the General Staff were
permitted to control all information of the tfttr Department's
current activities, only the glowing accounts of the ABF
would be released. The implications of that even had a
bearing on the biggest single prize of all, the presiden-
tial election of 1920.
The problem is not simply the use of appropriations.
rhat is perhaps the most easily determined issue. !»or is
the problem simply the difference in Information and
propaganda. here is a constant deluge of government com-
munications which would be enobled by the term propaganda,
i he Congress reacts when the appropriations and informa-
tion are Integrated into a program. Should that program
include the administration of information and appropria-
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The period which Included ..orld tar I narks the
polr.t In time when the term "democracy* found universal
acceptance as a moral good. Eat .11 son Administration had
no small part la this development, at question which
existed then and still persists is whether democracy is
merely a way of making decisions or is somehow the content
of those decisions.
Democracy only became an acceptable form of srovern-
ent during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
then, as societies *rew in complexity, the possibility of
a truly participatory democracy receded. Accordingly, the
question became one of the quality of representation. e
Athenian example served as an Ideal of classical theory
i
but it could not be applied to increasingly technical and
complex societies. The people do nothhave the capability
of assembling face to face* They can elect representatives.
Ihe act of election is the process of holding the
representative accountable. he representative, once elec-
ted, chooses policies which will look good at the next
election. Implicit in this procedural argument are several
assumptions. here must be a sufficient number of quali-
fied, able men who can stand for office. loll tics must be
a respectable thing. The range of decisions and choice of
f»af<





policies must be clear. Otherwise, demagogic overpromlslng
lead* to fraud, lastly, there are limits upon what govern-
ment can do. Dissenting views must be tolerated until the
legislative process has had time to work. Once It has
worked, the decision must be accepted by majority and
minority alike.
From the perspective of the standpatters, the
incumbent administration in 1919 was deficient in all the
above respects. The congressional election of 1919 was a
treneral repudiation of the Democratic Party and Its policies.
Inat election confirmed and reinforced the standpatters
•
belief that 1912 and 1916 had been false victories for the
Democrats. The defection of the Progressives, based upon
a rejection of the majority position, was a corruption of
the fundamental political process.
The entire social Justice movement of the years
previous to the war had labeled representatives as incom-
petent and corrupt. Beginning with the Overman Investiga-
tion in 1913* *oodrow *llson had tacitly embraced that
position. The steady investive of the rauekrakers had
libeled politics as something inherently dishonest.
Vrocressives generally were responsible for the
state of affairs. he voter's choice of policies had been
corrupted when the 1910 insurgency had made the party plat-
forms meaningless. ithout a clear responsibility vested
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accountability to the electorate. he *ilgon program,
enunciated In idealistic rhetoric • was precisely the over-
promising which worked the fraud upon the electorate. .he
culmination, of threats to the representative system was
llson's 191S preelection appeal for a sympathetic Congress.
The reaction was not entirely due to partisan
politics. Irsofar as there is such asthlng as a corporate
conscience of an institution, the conscience of the United
States Congress was offended* But, because the institu-
tion of the Presidency commands an almost automatic
respect, Wilson was not the explicit target of the reaction.
The Fresident, by departing for Prance and concentrating
his attention and interest on Versailles, had in effect
removed himself from the hurly-burly, bread and butter
Issues which were surfacing on the domestic front.
This left the field open to the Congress. at
conservatives could dramatize an anti-admlnlstration issue
by linking the dislocated economy to the bloated federal
bureaucracy. Besides the Inevitable small injustices per-
petrated by petty bureaucrats In all rapidly expanded
agencies, there was the spectacular failure of major
programs*
he target ultimately was always the administration.
The Issue would be resolved In 1920. However, it would
not be politic to attack an embattled leader in time of
adversity. ;>iEllarly, it would not be politic to attack
- tnoiq
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major segments of society by being too explicit In the
assault on administration programs designed for those
groups.
:e attack upon George Creel was for the general
issue of partisanship and propaganda. Only the most public
errors and personal improprieties were specified during the
investigations, i'o have identified and exploited the acti-
vities of the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy
would have been counter-productive. Certainly, Creel's
activities with the AFL front had partisan advantages.
Above the partisan activities, however, was the fact that
organised labor was supporting the government, even if it
was Democratic. If the connection between labor leaders
and government funds had been publicly made, the movement
of workers toward the Socialist pacifists or even the mili-
tant anti-war IW sight well have accelerated.
The threat of a hostile congressional investigation
was always present after November 1918. George Creel # s
connections were numerous and the American Alliance for
Labor and Democracy connection was only one. Like many
men who followed him, he ensured that his transgressions
of principle were always in the cause of national security.
There was no legislative authority for the Committee on
Public Information. Only the most enthusiastic supporter
would have proposed an appropriation for Creel in 1919*
Accordingly, the conservatives manipulated Creel
a m Arl-> •.*-*+% t^m * *
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as a symbol of the propagandist, the corrupter of language*
The objectively beautiful style of elisor, could never
subsequently rid Itself of the Creeling Incubus. As
events at home and abroad continued to deteriorate, this
dichotomy became increasingly clear. The wiser heads
among the reactionaries were perhaps pleased that Creel
existed.
The subsequent, 1920 investigation of the Committee
on Publie Information's finances did not surfact the issue
of the American Alliance for labor and Democracy, It was
not raised in the 192'* confrontation with enator Smoot.
here are three possible reasons for this. Firstly, the
labor situation was still explosive and an investigation
of the CPI-AALD would not contribute to conciliation.
Secondly, there were no records as reported by the liqui-
dating officers of the Council of National Defense. he
surviving drawer at the Archives bears the imprint of the
diligent archivist who may have found stray copies in
other files of the Committee on Public Information. None
of the material is from the New York office. Ds* Council
of National Defense, as liquidating authority, would have
nothing to gain by submitting an adverse report with such
political consequences.
Thirdly, there is the possibility that some members
of Congress were well aware of the activities of the
Committee on Miblic Information. There is no evidence to
-•I
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support this ©onclusion. ^vertheless, it Is not unreason-
able to infer that had the Congress known the full facts,
it Right well have concurred toward the end of industrial
peace. Having tacitly concurred, held hearings, and
granted an appropriation, the option of making the American
Alliance for Labor and Democracy a public issue later would
have been foreclosed. There is, of course, no evidence to
support such a conclusion.
George Creel and the Committee on public Information
were a problem which was especially susceptible to imme-
diate legislative solution. %.e United States i^mployment
Service was not so vulnerable. Formal political and econo-
mic relationships had been formed which presented a direct
threat to the standpatters' principles. The Inclination
of organize* labor toward the Democratic Party and the
Progressives had become evident as early as 1909. The
experience of the war had solidified the relation and labor
even spoke of debts to be repaid. If the administration
guaranteed labor only the gains held at war's end, it would
constitute an unforgivable intrusion into the free market.
At the other er\d of the continuum was federal coordination
of all workers, government ownership of utilities, and
active United States participation in the world's economy.
Ihese policies were quite explicit in John B.
Densmore's discussion of the risrht to employment belnp*












more explicit in uoger **• Babson's "Taylorism" of federal
"honor* records on all industrial worker*. Higher offi-
cials, even Wilson himself, moderated the extreme positions.
Lut once set in motion, the publicity machine could not be
stopped as the suffragists, Socialists, and strikers
raised their demands, .here were sound and reasonable
intermediate positions such as that taken by the Republican
representative John I, Nolan. However, the incredible
meddling in numerous local issues raised the threat of the
unaccountable, irresponsible and arrogant bureaucrat.
t»hile a representative could support a federal role in
employment coordination, he could not vote for the scandal-
wracked
The callous disregard for loeal sensibilities dis-
played by the DUI was made analogous to the suspension of
individual rights by the *ar Department. The simultaneous
adoption of the universal draft and the suspension of
volunteering went against American traditions. M refusal
of Theodore noosevelt's offer to raise a division and lead
it to France drove many Progressives back to regular
epublicanism. The activities of the Military Intelligence
Service and the CFI alienated liberals and ocialists fron
any total rapprochement with the Democrats.
Most importantly, the alleged abuses of military
Justice were calculated to touch the quick of American
anti-authoritarianism. he General ofcaff was stereotyped
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as nepotlstlc, authoritarian* and Incompetent—precisely
the Sana Image created for the administration, la addition,
each passionate plea from em offended IIP domrhboy repre-
sented an implicit threat against the presidential
aspirations of John J. Pershing. Popular here- that he was,
by September 1919 Civil *ar veteran Oscar Sherwood wanted
an investigation as to whether I ershlng had ever even
visited the front. Another representative claimed he had
used the CF1 for promoting his image.
Political conditions being what they were in 1919,
it was almost inevitable that the gag law should have been
passed. ihe abuses perceived elicited just such a reaction
from a formerly compliant and disorganized Congress.
Events had brought a spontaneous, unformed reaction which
required only master craftsmen such as Joseph Z, Cannon
and James k, Hmrm to fashion into revenue. The standpatters*
long memories could not fall to recall that March day In
1910 when they had been humiliated in the name of univer-
salist, humanitarian Ideals. By 1919 their enemies were
disillusioned and disorganized. Cannon and Mann proceeded
quietly, working within the rules of Congress and the
mechanism of the republican Party.
Returning home to the Hepubllcan Party was made
easy for the Progressives. Considerable criticism of
fellow-traveling republicans was eschewed In order that
they might return honorably. Public, partisan positions
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were taken on only the general issues ouch as executive
propaganda, the proliferation of placeholders, and the
economy. That left the lobbyists, such as industry maga-
zine, to fight the publicity battle with the bureaucrats
on specifics. This in turn made it easier to be against
the Wilson Administration without being for the stand-
patters. It was an exploitable consensus, albeit a
negative one.
The amendment which was finally passed and signed
was simply the explicit enunciation of a principle by the
legislative branch, xhe principle was well understood,
even if its application was less clear. he inability to
define the dividing line between propaganda and informa-
tion was a problem then, as now. Similarly, the Congress
was unsuccessful in specifying exactly how communications
between the executive and the legislative branches should
be conducted. here could be no argument upon the
principle, and yet the codification thereof eluded the
lawmakers.
he statement of the principle, however imprecise,
would In most cases be sufficient notice from one branch
to another. hie is the subsf&nee of which most House,
Senate, and Joint resolutions are formed. c communica-
tion effected may well be Imprecise. The executive branch,
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possible further action, such as investigation. This was
the sense of Congress to Secretary Wilson concerns
Densmore's activities in San Francisco.
Enactment of criminal law communicates a more
serious threat* It applies to individuals, not just
organizations and institutions. The gag amendment provided
for only a misdemeanor offense, but any situation In which
it might be Invoked would certainly provide for at least
political humiliation.
An element of the offense is the misuse of funds,
.he misdemeanor occurs in a context of communication, the
effect of which is the subversion of the representative
principle. hat Imprecision makes improbable any sequence
of events which would lead to prosecution. he more
definitively explicit the amendment became, the less likely
it was to be applied* Compounded with the growth of the
federal government and the reassertion of executive
Initiative since the New Deal, the law, as practical legls-
latlon, is reduced to an anachronism* he principle
remains. The threat of criminal prosecution and removal
also remains* The total effect favors a safe, procedural
reliance upon the "official channels" provision of the law
by government offlcere and employees* mla was the point
raised by Addison T. Smith.
.he gag law has certainly not had the effect its
authors Intended. Although it Is beyond the present scope,
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a suggestive line of inquiry would seek to answer whether
there was any coincidence in the New Deal programs, the
Near vs. Minnesota decision of 1931# and the adoption of
the popular title of "gag law." Such an inquiry would
be forced to deal with the growth of administrative law
and the principle of federal common law.
The passage of the gag law was an early manifesta-
tion of reaction against executive abuses of constitutional
procedure. The principles were as important as the parti-
san politics in restoring the legislative branch to its
role. ihe year was one of the most crucial In United
States history due to the interpenetratlon of economic,
political, and constitutional issues. In that context,
the abuses created a situation in which it was necessary
for the Congress to make explicit in law a principle which
has always been implicit in democratic and republican
theory. The fact that the particular law is imperfect does
not invalidate the principle.
The executive's use of crisis expediencies cut
deeply through American society in 1919. rhe programmatic
attempt to create new political constituencies was a
threat to the existing representative system. The federal
government was directly involved in the life of Individuals
and groups in an unprecedented way. The continued reliance
on expedient crisis measures brought a vigorous
congressional reaction.
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